University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School

Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law
2020

Distorted Choice in Corporate Bankruptcy
David A. Skeel Jr.
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Bankruptcy Law Commons, Business Organizations Law Commons, Courts Commons,
Economic Policy Commons, Finance Commons, Law and Economics Commons, Law and Society
Commons, and the Policy Design, Analysis, and Evaluation Commons

Repository Citation
Skeel, David A. Jr., "Distorted Choice in Corporate Bankruptcy" (2020). Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law.
2224.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/2224

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu.

DAVID A. SKEEL, JR.

Distorted Choice in Corporate Bankruptcy
abstrac t. We ordinarily assume that a central objective of every voting process is ensuring

an undistorted vote. Recent developments in corporate bankruptcy, which culminates with an
elaborate vote, are quite puzzling from this perspective. Two strategies now routinely used in big
cases are intended to distort, and clearly do distort, the voting process. Restructuring support
agreements (RSAs) and “deathtrap” provisions remove creditors’ ability to vote for or against a
proposed reorganization simply on the merits.
This Article oﬀers the ﬁrst comprehensive analysis of these new distortive techniques. One
possible solution is simply to ban distortive techniques, as several scholars advocate with RSAs
that oﬀer joinder bonuses. Although an antidistortion rule would be straightforward to implement, I argue this would be a mistake. The distortive techniques respond to developments that
have made reorganization diﬃcult, such as claims trading and a greater need for speed. Further,
Chapter 11’s baseline was never intended to be neutral: it nudges the parties toward conﬁrming a
reorganization plan. There also are independent justiﬁcations for some distortive techniques, and
the alternative to using them might be even worse—possibly leading to more ﬁre sales of debtors’ assets.
How can legitimate use of the new distortive techniques be distinguished from more pernicious practices? To answer this question, I outline four rules of thumb to assist the scrutiny.
Courts should consider whether holdouts are a serious threat, the magnitude of the coercion, the
signiﬁcance of any independent justiﬁcations, and whether the holdout threat is an intentional
feature of the parties’ contracts. I then apply the rules of thumb to a few prominent recent cases.
I conclude by considering two obvious extensions of the analysis, so-called “gi�ing” transactions
in Chapter 11 and bond-exchange oﬀers outside of bankruptcy.
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distorted choice in corporate bankruptcy

introduction
We ordinarily assume—or at least pretend to assume—that a central objective of every voting process is ensuring an undistorted vote. Protecting the integrity of a vote is sometimes diﬃcult, and the best way to achieve this may be
contested, as reﬂected in the controversies over the Supreme Court’s votingrights jurisprudence and in debates over possible foreign interference in the last
presidential election. 1 But nearly everyone agrees that the goal should be to
remove distortions so that voters can resolve the question at hand on the merits.
Recent developments in corporate bankruptcy are quite puzzling from this
perspective. Chapter 11 is organized around an elaborate vote. The debtor or
other proponent of a reorganization plan divides the creditors and shareholders
of the company into diﬀerent classes, 2 and the creditors or shareholders in each
class vote to approve or reject the proposed plan. 3 If every class of creditors and
shareholders votes in favor of the proposed plan, and it satisﬁes a number of
other requirements, the bankruptcy judge will conﬁrm the plan. 4 Bankruptcy
law gives the bankruptcy judge ample tools to police any distortions. Voting
cannot begin until the court approves a disclosure statement giving the creditors and shareholders “adequate information” about the proposed plan, 5 for instance, and the judge can disqualify problematic votes. 6 The law on the books
is intended to produce a simple undistorted vote.
Yet the law as it plays out in practice looks radically diﬀerent. Two of the
most important developments in recent bankruptcy practice are intended to
distort, and clearly do distort, the voting process. They remove creditors’ ability to vote simply on the merits—that is, to vote based on the plan’s proposed
payout for their class.
1.

2.

See, e.g., Tim Fernholz, No One Is Protecting the 2020 Election, QUARTZ (Nov. 23, 2019),
https://qz.com/1754314/no-one-is-protecting-the-2020-election [https://perma.cc/PVM69LLT]; Michael Wines, Protection of Voting Rights for Minorities Has Fallen Sharply, a New
Report Finds, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 12, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/12/us/votingrights-minorities.html [https://perma.cc/HNY7-T3WW] (describing the controversy over
the eﬀect of the Supreme Court decision to strike down parts of the Voting Rights Act).
11 U.S.C. § 1122 (2018) (governing the classiﬁcation of claims or interests).

3.

A class of creditors approves the plan if two thirds in amount and a majority in number of
the claims in the class cast a ballot vote “yes.” 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c) (2018).

4.

11 U.S.C. § 1129(a) (2018). If some but not all classes vote “yes,” the plan can sometimes be
approved through a “cramdown” process. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (2018).

5.

11 U.S.C. § 1125 (2018).
11 U.S.C. § 1126(e) (2018).

6.
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The ﬁrst is the emergence of restructuring support agreements (RSAs). 7 In
the simplest type of RSA, the debtor negotiates the terms of a potential reorganization plan with a subset of its creditors—o�en focusing on multiple classes of creditors but sometimes targeting a single class. The RSA commits its
signatories to support a future reorganization plan that conforms to the terms
of the RSA, including the proposed payout to each creditor class. A creditor
that signs the RSA relinquishes its ability to decide independently whether to
support a reorganization plan subsequently proposed by the debtor. It does this
before—o�en long before—a disclosure statement is approved and the proposed reorganization is submitted to creditors for a vote.
Many recent RSAs further distort the decisionmaking process by oﬀering to
pay a “support fee” to creditors who sign the RSA. Such “signing-fee RSAs”
oﬀer compensation that may reimburse creditors for the professional fees they
incurred while negotiating the RSA. A signing-fee RSA may also include a fee
for supporting the reorganization plan when it is proposed and waiving the
right to object, as in agreements involving Puerto Rico’s electricity company
and Peabody Energy. 8
Alternatively, the RSA may provide a beneﬁt to signatories, such as the
right to provide debtor-in-possession ﬁnancing during the case or to participate in a rights oﬀering a�er the debtor’s reorganization plan is conﬁrmed.9
These inducements, which are available only to those who sign the RSA, look
like a form of vote buying, since they compensate signatories who commit to
supporting an upcoming plan.
The second recent development is the use of “deathtrap” provisions in proposed reorganization plans. In a traditional deathtrap provision, the debtor
proposes to give a creditor class some form of compensation if it votes “yes,”
but cuts it oﬀ altogether if it votes “no.” The reorganization plan in the Trident
Holding Company bankruptcy said, for instance, that if the ﬁrst lien classes
and the second lien classes “are Accepting Classes, each Holder of an Allowed
Second Lien Claim shall receive its Pro Rata share and interest in 1% of the
Warrants,” but if the First Lien Classes or the Second Lien Classes “are not Ac7.

RSAs are sometimes called Plan Support Agreements, or PSAs. The term RSA is typically
used when the agreement is negotiated before bankruptcy, whereas PSA is usually used
when the agreement is negotiated a�er the ﬁling.

8.

For a detailed discussion of the Puerto Rico electricity company and Peabody Energy agreements, see infra Part IV.

9.

Rights oﬀerings give creditors the right to buy equity in the reorganized company at a set
price. For an overview of the use of rights oﬀerings in bankruptcy, see Jay M. Goﬀman &
George Howard, Rights Oﬀerings Prove Popular with Both Debtors, Distressed Investors: Billions
Raised in Recent Oﬀerings for Companies, J. CORP. RENEWAL, Jan.-Feb. 2018, at 4-8.

370

distorted choice in corporate bankruptcy

cepting Classes, Holders of Allowed Second Lien Claims shall not receive any
distributions on account of such Allowed Second Lien Claims.” 10
A more elaborate version—the “individually targeted deathtrap”—may oﬀer
one form of compensation to individual creditors who vote “yes” and a diﬀerent compensation to individual creditors who vote “no.” 11 In each case, the
point is to apply pressure, using both a carrot (the compensation for a “yes”
vote) and a stick (worse treatment of “no” votes) to nudge the creditors or
shareholders to vote in favor of the plan. 12
RSAs and deathtraps can distort the voting process in at least three ways. 13
First, if they include supplemental payments, the additional compensation
pressures creditors to vote for the reorganization plan even if creditors believe
the payout is too low. These payments require a creditor to forgo compensation
if she or the class votes “no,” and thus make a “no” vote more expensive and
less attractive for reasons unrelated to the creditor’s views on the underlying
merits of the plan. Second, distortive techniques can procedurally warp the voting process by binding creditors before the plan has been formally proposed
and using exploding oﬀers to induce creditors to commit early on. Third, RSAs
and deathtraps may even distort the voting process by decreasing creditors’
likelihood of success in challenging the plan in the event the class of creditors
votes “no.” 14 By making the alternative to voting “yes” less attractive, these
techniques can coerce creditors to vote for the plan. 15
10.

Joint Plan of Reorganization of Trident Holding Company, LLC and Its Debtor Aﬃliates at
26, In re Trident Holding Co., LLC, No. 19-10384 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2019).
11. Under the Arch Coal, Inc. reorganization plan, for instance, if a class of “unsecured funded
debt” claims voted “yes,” they would receive a speciﬁed distribution. If the class voted “no,”
claimants that had signed the RSA or did not opt out of the plan’s third-party releases would
receive the distribution, but claimants who voted “no” would not. Debtors’ Third Amended
Joint Plan of Reorganization Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code at 31-32, In re Arch
Coal, Inc., No. 16-40120-705 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. July 6, 2016).
12. In philosophy, the combination of a threat and a beneﬁt has been dubbed a “throﬀer.” Hillel
Steiner, Individual Liberty, 75 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 33, 39 (1974).
13. Here and throughout the Article, I use the term “distortion” broadly, to encompass any
strategy that creates incentives for a creditor to support a plan that the creditor might not
support if she were voting simply on the merits.
14.
15.

See infra text accompanying notes 88-89.
This Article is primarily concerned with distortions that are created by the RSA itself.
Debtor-in-possession ﬁnancing agreements that give senior lenders control of the restructuring process are sometimes accompanied by RSAs with the senior lenders. See, e.g., Kenneth Ayotte & Jared A. Ellias, Bankruptcy Process for Sale 2 (May 26, 2020) (unpublished
manuscript) (on ﬁle with author) (discussing the control of the lenders in the Neiman Marcus and J. Crew bankruptcies). In this context, senior lenders are taking advantage of the
leverage they have as the source of essential ﬁnancing.
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Despite the ubiquity of the new distortive techniques, they are just beginning to attract attention in the scholarly literature. Several scholars have written about RSAs, 16 but I am not aware of any articles that devote meaningful attention to the use of deathtrap provisions or to the increase in voting
distortions more generally. This Article is the ﬁrst to attempt a more comprehensive analysis of the new landscape of distorted voting.
One obvious solution to bankruptcy’s voting distortions might be to prohibit or sharply restrict their use. This is the usual strategy elsewhere, and in
corporate law, Delaware courts have in fact banned a somewhat analogous distortion that featured in freeze-out mergers. 17 In the past, a corporate parent
could use subtle forms of coercion when freezing out the minority shares of a
subsidiary. If the parent made a tender oﬀer for the minority shares, for instance, it could hint that any untendered shares would be neglected a�er the
tender oﬀer, 18 thus diminishing the value of untendered shares. Delaware
courts have cracked down on these practices by imposing a stringent antidistortion rule. 19
The same approach could easily be employed in Chapter 11. In its strong
form, an antidistortion rule would ban the use of RSAs and deathtrap provisions altogether, since each distorts the voting process. Under a weaker antidistortion rule, courts might prohibit only the variations of RSAs and deathtraps that introduce the most signiﬁcant distortions, such as signing-fee RSAs
and individually targeted deathtraps.
The antidistortion approach has considerable appeal, especially for those of
us who already are attracted to rule-of-law moralism. It would ensure a much
more unbiased Chapter 11 vote than the vote in most current reorganization
cases, while also reducing the risk of windfalls to favored creditors. It also
16.

Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy’s Quiet Revolution, 91 AM. BANKR. L.J. 593 (2017); Edward J.
Janger & Adam J. Levitin, Badges of Opportunism: Principles for Policing Restructuring Support
Agreements, 13 BROOK. J. CORP., FIN. & COM. L. 169 (2018).

17.

In a typical freeze-out merger, a controlling shareholder (o�en the parent corporation) uses
a merger to force minority shareholders to take cash for their shares, leaving the controlling
shareholder with 100% of the company. The key case constraining the freeze-out strategy
described in the text that follows is In re Pure Resources, Inc., Shareholders Litigation, 808 A.2d
421 (Del. Ch. 2002), which is discussed at the outset of Part II.
18. If the controller explicitly said that it planned to delist the shares, the tender oﬀer might
have been enjoined as impermissibly coercive. See In re Pure Res., Inc., S’holders Litig., 808
A.2d at 438 n.26. But the controller probably could have gotten away with a vaguer threat.
19.
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Lucian Bebchuk has advocated an antidistortion rule that would go even further and would
attempt to remove even minor distortive eﬀects from all tender oﬀers. Lucian Bebchuk, Toward Undistorted Choice and Equal Treatment in Corporate Takeovers, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1693,
1747-52 (1985).
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would be relatively simple to implement. As already noted, existing bankruptcy
law gives judges powerful tools to curb voting distortions. Before the debtor
can solicit votes on a proposed reorganization plan during the case, for instance, the bankruptcy court must ﬁnd that the disclosure statement provides
“adequate information” to creditors. 20 A court could easily hold that an RSA
violates this provision—and on rare occasions, courts have done precisely
this. 21 RSAs and deathtrap provisions also could be struck down as inconsistent with the obligation that the plan be “proposed in good faith and not by
any means forbidden by law.” 22 If antidistortion is the best solution, it lies
readily at hand.
The ﬁrst clue that banning the new distortive techniques may not be the
optimal solution comes from the response of the bankruptcy courts. With only
a few exceptions, most of them in the early 2000s, bankruptcy judges have upheld both RSAs and deathtrap provisions. To be sure, bankruptcy judges’ endorsement does not necessarily mean there is no reason to worry about the distortive techniques. It is possible that judges have not yet fully recognized the
distortive eﬀects of the new techniques, or that bankruptcy judges are too quick
to approve the use of provisions that make successful reorganization more likely. But courts’ acquiescence to the new distortive techniques suggests these
strategies may be more justiﬁed than they initially appear.
It turns out they are. The justiﬁcation for permitting at least some use of
these distortive techniques begins to emerge if we take a closer look at the environment in which the new distortive techniques emerged. In the early years of
Chapter 11, large debtors had the option of devising reorganization plans at a
leisurely pace—they had a long “runway,” in current jargon. 23 This is no longer
the case. Financial distress must now be resolved much more quickly, both because the value of many troubled companies is evanescent and because lenders
and other creditors use debtors’ need for liquidity as leverage to compress the

20.

11 U.S.C. § 1125(b) (2018).
Delaware bankruptcy courts appear to have invalidated early RSAs on this ground in two
2002 decisions—In re Stations Holding Co., No. 02-10882 (MFW), 2002 WL 31947022, at *3
(Bankr. D. Del. Sept. 30, 2002), and In re NII Holdings, Inc., 288 B.R. 356, 362 (Bankr. D.
Del. 2002)—but these cases were dismissed as having little precedential or persuasive power
in a subsequent decision, In re Indianapolis Downs, LLC., 486 B.R. 286, 295 (Bankr. D. Del.
2013).
22. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(3) (2018).
21.

23.

The length of many early cases was seen as a major problem with Chapter 11. See Lynn M.
LoPucki, The Trouble with Chapter 11, 1993 WIS. L. REV. 729, 731.
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timeline of the case. 24 Whereas the typical Chapter 11 case lasted more than
two years prior to 2000, 25 the duration is now roughly one year. 26
Achieving a speedy reorganization would be challenging even if the debtor
were dealing with a stable group of creditors. But because claims trading is
now ubiquitous, creditors’ interests are highly unstable. 27 A potential deal
hammered out today may fall apart tomorrow a�er some claims are sold to
buyers who do not believe the proposed deal is a good one.
It also is easier than ever before for a distressed-debt investor to assemble a
blocking position and thereby veto the debtor’s proposed reorganization plan. 28
The explosion of claims trading appears to have begun roughly a decade a�er
the current bankruptcy laws were adopted, 29 and the market for distressed debt
has grown exponentially since then. 30
The ease with which distressed-debt traders can now acquire veto power
can be both helpful and harmful. If the debtor proposes a problematic reorganization plan, a creditor’s eﬀorts to block the plan may beneﬁt other creditors as
24.

Compare Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, 55 STAN. L. REV.
751, 765-66 (2002) (discussing how ﬁrms are increasingly comprised of intangible assets),
and id. at 784 (“The control that the lender has over cash collateral makes it hard to enter into a ﬁnancing arrangement without its explicit blessing.”), with LoPucki, supra note 23, at
739-45 (criticizing the previous length of bankruptcy cases).
25. See, e.g., Arturo Bris, Ivo Welch & Ning Zhu, The Costs of Bankruptcy: Chapter 7 Liquidation
Versus Chapter 11 Reorganization, 61 J. FIN. 1253, 1270 (2006) (ﬁnding an average duration of
2.3 years for Chapter 11 cases ﬁled between 1995 and 2001).
26.

See Foteini Teloni, Chapter 11 Duration, Pre-Planned Cases, and Reﬁling Rates: An Empirical
Analysis in the Post-BAPCPA Era, 23 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 571, 592-93 (2015) (ﬁnding
that the mean duration for traditional Chapter 11 cases dropped from 634 to 430 days a�er
2005, and the mean for all cases (including prepackaged bankruptcies) fell from 480 to 261
days a�er 2005).
27. The ﬁrst scholar to call attention to this eﬀect of claims trading was Fred Tung. Frederick
Tung, Conﬁrmation and Claims Trading, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1684 (1996). For evidence that
there is less turnover than is sometimes thought, see Jared A. Ellias, Bankruptcy Claims Trading, 15 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 772, 782-83 (2018).
28. A distressed-debt trader who acquires one third of the value of the claims in a class can block
approval, since approval requires two thirds. 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c) (2018).
29. The dramatic increase in claims trading began in the late 1980s and early 1990s. See, e.g.,
Michelle M. Harner, The Corporate Governance and Public Policy Implications of Activist Distressed Debt Investing, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 703, 710 n.22 (2008) (“The practice of buying
distressed debt . . . morphed into a more sophisticated and activist investment practice with
the stock failure of 1987 and the corporate failures that followed.”).
30.

374

Estimates of the size of the distressed-debt market vary widely, in part due to diﬀering deﬁnitions of distressed debt. According to one, “[a]s of June 30, 2019, the total face value of
distressed and defaulted debt . . . [was] $773 billion.” Edward I. Altman & Robert Benhenni,
The Anatomy of Distressed Debt Markets, 11 ANN. REV. FIN. ECON. 21, 23 (2019).
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well. But the veto facilitated by claims trading may also enable a creditor who
has a conﬂict of interest—such as a competitor of the debtor—or other perverse
incentive to thwart conﬁrmation of a reorganization plan that serves the interests of the debtor and other creditors. Moreover, even if a creditor does not
have problematic incentives, it may seek to use its leverage to obtain a disproportionate recovery for itself. 31 Given that distressed-debt traders o�en have a
short-term focus and little reputational stake in the consequences of their intervention, the potential for problematic holdouts is signiﬁcant.
Of course, the emergence of new obstacles to a successful reorganization
does not justify voting distortions by itself. All else equal, the appropriate response might be something along the lines of “tough luck.” But all else is not
equal in bankruptcy. Perhaps surprisingly for those who assume votes should
be undistorted, the Chapter 11 vote is not intended to be neutral and uncoerced. The voting rules already include features that are designed to nudge the
parties toward conﬁrmation of a reorganization plan. If one or more classes
vote against a proposed reorganization plan, for instance, the plan can nevertheless be “crammed down” if, among other things, the proposed plan “does
not discriminate unfairly, and is fair and equitable.” 32 There also is an implicit
threat that, if the parties fail to devise a conﬁrmable reorganization plan, the
case will be converted to Chapter 7, and the debtor’s assets will be sold oﬀ in
pieces by a court-appointed trustee. 33
If the goal is to tilt the playing ﬁeld slightly toward reorganization, and recent developments have made reorganization more diﬃcult, distortive techniques that so�en the eﬀects of these developments might not be inherently
bad. Distortive techniques may sometimes be appropriate to counteract destructive holdout activity. 34
There also are independent justiﬁcations for some distortive techniques.
The signing-fee RSA, for instance—which some commentators treat as per se

31.

For a similar typology of holdout behavior, see William W. Bratton & Adam J. Levitin, The
New Bond Workouts, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 1597, 1607 (2018). In addition to holdout creditors
who vote strategically because they have a conﬂict of interest or seek to obtain an extra payoﬀ for themselves, Bratton and Levitin include creditors who vote sincerely but misjudge the
beneﬁts of the proposed transaction.
32. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1) (2018).
33.
34.

11 U.S.C. § 1112 (2018) (governing conversion or dismissal).
Janger and Levitin have similar concerns and advocate that claims traders’ voting rights be
limited to the amount they paid for the claim. Edward J. Janger & Adam J. Levitin, One Dollar, One Vote: Mark-to-Market Governance in Bankruptcy, 104 IOWA L. REV. 1857, 1858 (2019).
Although I am not persuaded that distressed-debt investors should automatically be disenfranchised in this way, I do favor giving debtors some ability to discipline holdouts.
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disqualifying 35—may compensate the signatories for the cost of negotiating a
plan that beneﬁts all creditors and for committing themselves and any successors to support the proposed reorganization plan even if a better alternative
emerges. A deathtrap provision may resolve—or at least postpone until a�er
conﬁrmation—a high-stakes dispute that could otherwise derail the reorganization process by consuming the debtor in time-consuming litigation. 36 To be
sure, the purported beneﬁts of a distortive technique may be exaggerated or
outweighed by the potentially pernicious eﬀects of the technique. But there
o�en are legitimate justiﬁcations for using a technique even if it incidentally
distorts the voting process. In this sense, the new distortive techniques are
quite similar to lockups in corporate merger-and-acquisition transactions,
where they also can be both problematic and beneﬁcial. 37
Finally, we need to consider how the parties might respond to a partial or
complete ban of distortive techniques. One obvious possibility is that some distressed debtors that might otherwise reorganize under Chapter 11 would now
be unable to do so and would be forced to resolve their distress through a sale
of assets instead. To be sure, asset sales can be an eﬀective solution to the debtor’s ﬁnancial distress. 38 But no one has a vote in an asset sale, 39 and an antidistortion rule could misdirect debtors away from the traditional Chapter 11
process when Chapter 11 would be the best solution to the debtor’s ﬁnancial
distress.
These complicating factors suggest it would be a mistake to ban distortive
techniques altogether. This doesn’t mean that distortive techniques should always be permitted, however. RSAs and deathtrap provisions sometimes do distort the voting process in indefensible ways. RSA fees sometimes appear to be
little more than vote buying, for instance, and the structure of some deathtrap
provisions is highly coercive.

35.

Janger & Levitin, supra note 16, at 186 (characterizing payments to signatories as “badges of
opportunism”). Douglas Baird also appears to be skeptical of RSA fees, and he cites complaints that the proposed fees in In re Caesars Entertainment Operating Co., 533 B.R. 714
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2015) were “coercive” and “improper,” but concludes “they are somewhat
rare.” See Baird, supra note 16, at 610. This is no longer true.

36.

This appears to have been true in the Momentive case, where the deathtrap’s terms reﬂected a
dispute over a make-whole provision. See infra Section I.B.

37.

The analogy to corporate lockups (or breakup fees) is discussed in Section III.C.
See Jean-Marie Meier & Henri Servaes, The Bright Side of Fire Sales, 32 REV. FIN. STUD. 4228,
4230 (2019). For a more skeptical view, see Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty, Bankruptcy Fire Sales, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1, 8-11 (2007).

38.

39.
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Thus far, courts seem to have taken a “know it when they see it” approach
to the new distortive techniques. When a debtor agreed to exchange 100% of
the company’s post-reorganization stock for a secured creditor’s $238 million
claim—without doing a market test of the transaction or negotiating with any
other creditors (including nearly $1.2 billion of other secured claims)—the
court balked, ﬁnding that the agreement “breeds contempt rather than fostering negotiations,” and refused to approve it. 40 In most (though not all) other
cases, courts have approved the distortive techniques.
My goal in this Article is to oﬀer additional guidance for the determinations
courts are now making. I start with the standard assumption that the general
objective of the bankruptcy process is value maximization. Chapter 11 does not
seek to achieve this objective directly, however. Instead, it provides a framework for renegotiating the parties’ entitlements that culminates with the Chapter 11 voting process. An assessment of the new distortive techniques therefore
needs to consider carefully both the parties’ entitlements and the procedural
integrity of the Chapter 11 process.
My analysis suggests that some distortive techniques should nearly always
be permitted and others usually barred. Traditional deathtraps are an example
of the former; exploding RSAs that give potential signatories only a brief period of time to decide are in the latter category. For distortive techniques that fall
in the middle, I oﬀer a handful of rules of thumb. I then apply the rules of
thumb to four important recent cases. My analysis suggests that if bankruptcy
judges clearly signal a willingness to strike down egregious uses of distortive
techniques, the parties will adjust accordingly, eventually rendering court intervention unnecessary in most cases. 41
Part I of the Article describes the new distortive techniques in more detail,
using the RSA in the ResCap case42 and the deathtrap provision in the Momentive case43 as my principal illustrations. In Part II, I ask why bankruptcy
courts have been so willing to condone their use, particularly given courts’ hostility to distortion in other contexts. I argue that the answer lies in the dramatic
recent changes that have made corporate reorganization much more diﬃcult
40.

In re Innkeepers USA Tr., 442 B.R. 227, 234 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010). The court also questioned the need to enter into the agreement so early in the case. See id. at 233.
41. Cf. Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case
of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 950-51 (1997) (describing how divorce law provides a framework for parties to negotiate their rights and responsibilities and how o�en parties “resolve
distributional questions . . . without bringing any contested issue to court for adjudication”).
42.

In re Residential Capital, LLC, 501 B.R. 549 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013).
43. In re MPM Silicones, LLC, 518 B.R. 740 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014).
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than in the past, coupled with the surprisingly unneutral baseline of the Chapter 11 voting process.
Parts III and IV develop and apply a framework for scrutinizing the new
distortive techniques. Part III oﬀers four rules of thumb. The ﬁrst and second
focus on the threat of holdout behavior and the magnitude of procedural or entitlement coercion. The third and fourth consider any independent justiﬁcations for a distortive technique that might warrant marginally more coercion
and in rarer cases, any special contractual terms that might call for less. I conclude the Part by considering whether and when a creditor should be permitted
to change its vote on a plan. In Part IV, I apply the rules of thumb to some
complex recent cases: the elaborate RSA for Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (PREPA), Puerto Rico’s electricity company; the convoluted deathtrap
provision in the Momentive case; and the use of both RSAs and deathtraps in
two prominent coal-company reorganizations.
Although my focus is on strategies that distort the Chapter 11 vote, the
analysis has implications for a variety of related issues. In Part V, I consider two
of the most obvious extensions: so-called gi�ing transactions in Chapter 11 and
coercive bond exchanges outside of bankruptcy. Gi�ing transactions are especially interesting, because they are quite similar to RSAs and deathtrap provisions in some respects, yet courts have viewed them with considerably more
suspicion. I consider in Part V why this might be so.
i. the new distortive techniques
When the dra�ers cra�ed current Chapter 11, they imagined the vote as the
capstone of a three-step process. First, the debtor would negotiate over the
terms of a potential restructuring with the senior creditor (usually a bank), the
creditors’ committee (representing the widely scattered unsecured creditors),
and the shareholders. The debtor would then ask the court to approve a disclosure statement outlining the terms of the proposed plan, and to authorize the
debtor to send ballots to each creditor or shareholder. Only then would a creditor or shareholder accept or reject the plan, based on a simple assessment of the
payout the plan promised to the claims or interests in the creditor’s or shareholder’s class.
In current cases, the voting process looks very diﬀerent than the dra�ers
envisioned. In most large cases, the debtor uses one or both of the new distortive techniques to shape the Chapter 11 vote: RSAs to lock in the votes of many
or most creditors before a disclosure statement is ever approved, and deathtrap
provisions to entice creditors to vote “yes.”
In this Part, I use two brief case studies to show how the new distortive
techniques work. I begin with ResCap, which featured a prebankruptcy RSA
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followed by a more comprehensive post-petition RSA. I then turn to Momentive, which included a clever deathtrap provision. In each context, I also describe variations on the distortive techniques that have been used in other cases.
A. RSAs (and PSAs): The ResCap Case
Debtors use RSAs (and PSAs) to lock in creditor support for an anticipated
reorganization plan. Sometimes arranged before bankruptcy and sometimes
during the case, an RSA or PSA commits the creditors who sign the agreement
to support any future reorganization plan that reﬂects the terms of the agreement.
Perhaps the best-known case with an extensive RSA/PSA is ResCap. ResCap, which was spun oﬀ from General Motors in the early 2000s, was the parent corporation of Residential Funding Company (RFC), one of the largest securitizers of home mortgages in the early 2000s.44 RFC purchased mortgage
loans from the lenders who made the original loans (sometimes called “correspondent lenders”) and resold them into residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) trusts. Cash from investors in the trusts ﬁnanced the trusts’ purchase of the mortgage loans; the investors were then compensated from the
payments that homeowners made on the underlying mortgage loans.
When the housing market began to wobble in 2007 on the eve of the Great
Recession, many of the underlying mortgages in the trusts started defaulting.
This eventually prompted an onslaught of litigation against ResCap and RFC
by investors in the trusts and monoline insurers who had insured the investment interests in many of the trusts. These plaintiﬀs alleged that RFC had misrepresented the quality of the mortgage loans it included in the trusts.
As ResCap teetered on the edge of bankruptcy in early 2012, it reached a
settlement with the plaintiﬀs in the two largest groups of RMBS class-action
claims and memorialized the settlement in a Plan Support Agreement that was
intended to serve as the basis for a reorganization plan. Under the PSA, the
RMBS investors would be given an $8.7 billion allowed claim in the bankruptcy; 45 under a companion agreement, Ally Financial, a former aﬃliate of Res44.

ResCap’s business is summarized in a massive examiner’s report ﬁled in the case. See Report
of Arthur J. Gonzalez, as Examiner at III-1 to -6, In re Residential Capital, LLC, 501 B.R. 549
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 12-12020 (MG)).

45.

Aﬃdavit of James Whitlinger, Chief Financial Oﬃcer of Residential Capital, LLC, in Support of Chapter 11 Petitions and First Day Pleadings, ex. 10, at 9, In re Residential Capital,
LLC, 501 B.R. 549 (No. 12-12020 (MG)), ECF No. 6. Exhibits 8 through 10 show the three
Plan Support Agreements (PSAs).
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Cap and RFC that did not ﬁle for bankruptcy, would contribute $750 million,
as well as provide $220 million in debtor-in-possession ﬁnancing to facilitate a
sale of ResCap and its aﬃliates’ mortgage-servicing assets. 46 The parties
planned to sell the servicing assets almost immediately and to move the case
quickly through Chapter 11. 47
Although the asset sale succeeded, garnering $2.1 billion, the original PSA
met ﬁerce resistance from other parties in the case. The Unsecured Creditors
Committee insisted that the $8.7 billion claim was far too high, 48 and a major
monoline insurer condemned the agreement as “more about getting a release
for Ally than achieving a fair and equitable deal.” 49 A�er the debtor abandoned
the agreement under an onslaught of opposition a few months later, a mediator
was appointed (then-sitting Bankruptcy Judge James Peck), and the parties
began negotiating a new PSA.
Four months later, the parties agreed to a new PSA.50 The new PSA ultimately encompassed more than twenty constituencies, including the debtors,
Ally, the Unsecured Creditors Committee, the major RMBS claimants and the
monoline insurers. 51 The PSA included a term sheet detailing how each class
would be treated under the reorganization plan contemplated by the PSA, 52 as
well as the structure of a trust that would be set up to pursue avoidance claims
and other actions a�er conﬁrmation of the plan.53 As is typical with these
46.

Id. ex. 8, at 6-7. Exhibit 8 shows the Plan Support Agreement with AFI.
47. In an aﬃdavit accompanying the ﬁling, which came ﬁve days a�er the PSA was signed,
ResCap’s chief ﬁnancial oﬃcer predicted that ResCap would propose a reorganization plan
within thirty days. Id. at 4.
48.

Objection of the Oﬃcial Committee of Unsecured Creditors to the Debtors’ Motion Pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9019 for Approval of the RMBS Trust Settlement Agreements at 22,
In re Residential Capital, LLC, 501 B.R. 549 (No. 12-12020 (MG)), ECF No. 2825.
49. Objection of Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp. and Certain Aﬃliates to Debtors’ Motion
Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9019 for Order Approving RMBS Trust Settlement Agreements at 7, In re Residential Capital, LLC, 501 B.R. 549 (No. 12-12020 (MG)), ECF No. 2791;
see also id. at 2 (“The settlement . . . is an integral part of the Debtors’ eﬀorts to obtain a
third party release for parent Ally Financial, Inc. (“AFI”) and its nondebtor subsidiaries . . . .”).
50. Debtor’s Motion for an Order Under Bankruptcy Code Sections 105(a) and 363(b) Authorizing the Debtors to Enter into and Perform Under a Plan Support Agreement with Ally Financial Inc., the Creditors’ Committee, and Certain Consenting Claimants, ex. 3, In re Residential Capital, LLC, 501 B.R. 549 (No. 12-12020 (MG)), ECF No. 3814 [hereina�er ResCap
PSA].
51.
52.

See Findings of Fact at 33, In re Residential Capital, 501 B.R. 549 (No. 12-12020 (MG)), ECF
No. 6066.

ResCap PSA, supra note 50, ex. B, at 2-16.
53. Id. ex. B, annex II.
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agreements, the PSA included milestones establishing a strict timeline for the
plan-conﬁrmation process: a deﬁnitive PSA agreement by May 23, 2013; the ﬁling of a reorganization plan and disclosure statement, as well as court approval
of the PSA, by July 3, 2013; and conﬁrmation of the reorganization plan by December 15, 2013.54 To lock in the parties’ commitment, signatories were forbidden from objecting to the reorganization plan, directly or indirectly supporting
any alternative plan, 55 and transferring any portion of their claims unless the
purchaser of their claim also agreed to be bound by the PSA. 56
The initial and ﬁnal ResCap PSAs illustrate the two approaches commonly
taken with RSAs and PSAs. The ﬁrst version focused on the dominant class of
creditors in the case, the billions of dollars of RMBS claims, whereas the ﬁnal
PSA was far more comprehensive. From the plan proponents’ perspective,
there are obvious tradeoﬀs between the two. While it is easier to reach agreement with a single key constituency than with numerous constituencies, a narrower PSA is more likely to face serious pushback from other creditors.
Neither PSA included a signing fee for parties that joined the agreement.57
Recent agreements o�en do have such fees. The agreement in the PREPA reorganization, for instance, promised signatories a “waiver and support” payment
equivalent to 1.62% of their claims. 58 Also, rather than an explicit fee, RSAs
sometimes compensate their signatories in other ways, such as inviting them to
participate in a rights oﬀering. 59 Even without these fees, the simplest PSA or
RSA distorts the voting process by committing the signatories to vote in favor
of a future plan; distortion is especially obvious when signatories receive a fee
that is not available to those who do not sign the agreement.
B. Deathtrap Plan Provisions: The Momentive Case
The second distortive strategy is including a “deathtrap” provision in a
proposed reorganization plan. In a traditional deathtrap, one class of creditors
(or sometimes multiple classes) is told that it will receive a speciﬁed payout if
the class votes in favor of the proposed reorganization and a worse payout if the

54.
55.

Id. ex. A, at 4.
Id. at 10.

56.

Id. at 12.
57. The PSAs did compensate the plaintiﬀs’ attorneys by giving them substantial claims in the
case. Id. ex. B, at 5.
58. The PREPA RSA is discussed in detail in Section IV.A.
59.

This was the approach in In re Peabody Energy Corp., 933 F.3d 918 (8th Cir. 2019), discussed
in Section IV.C.2.
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class votes “no.” In many cases, the deathtrap promises a payment to the class if
it votes in favor of a proposed plan but denies it anything if it votes against. 60
The leading recent case, In re MPM Silicones, LLC (o�en referred to as Momentive, the debtor’s trade name), included a more creative deathtrap. 61 Momentive was a silicone and quartz manufacturer that had been acquired in 2006
by Apollo, the well-known private-equity fund. 62 A�er a highly contested set of
negotiations, Momentive proposed a reorganization plan that employed a
deathtrap provision to try to pin down its senior creditors (First and 1.5 Lien
Noteholders). The deathtrap gave the senior creditors a choice. They could accept the plan, which promised full payment in cash but required the creditors
to waive a $200 million make-whole claim, 63 or they could reject the plan, assert their make-whole claim, and receive replacement notes plus the cramdown
rate of interest. Because the cramdown rate of interest o�en undercompensates
creditors and the senior creditors’ success on their make-whole claim was highly uncertain, the deathtrap structure put pressure on the senior creditors to accept the cash payout.
The senior creditors nevertheless rejected the plan and chose to litigate the
make-whole claim. 64 This proved to be a mistake, as the bankruptcy court held
that they were not entitled to the make-whole payment, 65 a decision that was

60.
61.

See, e.g., In re Zenith Elecs. Corp., 241 B.R. 92, 105 (Bankr. D. Del. 1999).
518 B.R. 740 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014).

62.

Emily Glazer, Momentive Performance Preparing for Mid-April Bankruptcy Filing, WALL ST. J.
(Apr. 1, 2014, 6:43 PM ET), https://www.wsj.com/articles/momentive-performancepreparing-for-mid-april-bankruptcy-ﬁling-1396388146 [https://perma.cc/SH53-XWDP].
63. In re MPM Silicones, L.L.C., 874 F.3d 787, 805 (2d Cir. 2017). A “make-whole” provision requires a breaching promisor to pay a fee designed to compensate the promisee for proﬁts
lost as a result of the breach. In a loan contract, the lost proﬁts o�en consist largely of unaccrued interest payments. Some courts have enforced make-whole payments. See, e.g., In re
Energy Future Holdings Corp., 842 F.3d 247, 261 (3d Cir. 2016) (holding that the makewhole provision must be honored); In re Sch. Specialty, Inc., No. 13-10125 (KJC), 2013 WL
1838513, at *5 (Bankr. D. Del. Apr. 22, 2013) (concluding that a make-whole provision was a
legitimate liquidated-damages provision, not unmatured interest, which would be precluded
by section 502(b)(2)). Other courts have rejected them. See, e.g., In re MPM Silicones, LLC,
531 B.R. 321, 336 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), aﬀ ’d in part, rev’d in part, 874 F.3d 787, 794 (2d Cir. 2017)
(holding that a make-whole provision was unenforceable because it did not “clearly and unambiguously call for the payment of the make-whole premium in the event of an acceleration of debt”).
64.
65.
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In re MPM Silicones, LLC, 518 B.R. at 749-51.
Corrected and Modiﬁed Bench Ruling on Conﬁrmation of Debtors’ Joint Chapter Plan of
Reorganization for Momentive Performance Materials Inc. and its Aﬃliated Debtors at 2950, In re MPM Silicones, LLC, 518 B.R. 740 (No. 14-22503-rdd), ECF No. 979.
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subsequently aﬃrmed by the district court and the Second Circuit. 66 A�er their
prospects of winning on the make-whole provision deteriorated, the senior
creditors sought to rescind their “no” vote on the reorganization plan and to
take the originally oﬀered cash payout. The bankruptcy court told the senior
creditors that it was too late—their “no” vote could not be reversed. 67 In eﬀect,
the court validated the coercive structure of the deathtrap treatment by refusing
to undo it a�er the fact.
In one sense, the deathtrap provision failed from the debtor’s perspective: it
did not induce the senior creditors to abandon their make-whole claim and to
vote in favor of the proposed reorganization plan. But it did enable Momentive
to postpone the make-whole litigation until a�er the reorganization plan was
conﬁrmed.
Some recent deathtrap provisions are tailored to individual creditors rather
than to the class as a whole. The Arch Coal reorganization plan featured a
deathtrap that promised a payout to individual creditors who voted in favor of
the plan, even if the class as a whole rejected the plan. 68 Creditors who voted
against the plan would not receive any compensation if the class voted “no.”
As with RSAs, bankruptcy courts regularly seem to approve the use of
deathtraps in proposed reorganization plans. Other than a court rejecting the
technique in one of the earliest cases featuring a deathtrap, they are nearly always permitted despite the distorting eﬀect they have on creditors’ voting decisions. 69
C. A Brief History of the New Distortive Techniques
Having described how the new distortive techniques work, I brieﬂy recount
their emergence and evolution in the discussion that follows.

66.

In re MPM Silicones, LLC, 531 B.R. at 336-38, aﬀ ’d in part, rev’d in part, 874 F.3d at 801-04.

67.

Order Denying Motion of the Requisite First Lien Noteholders Pursuant to Bankruptcy
Rule 3018(a) to Change Votes Relating to Debtors’ Joint Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization
at 1-2, In re MPM Silicones, LLC, 518 B.R. 740 (No. 14-22503-rdd), ECF No. 1003; Order
Denying Motion of the Requisite 1.5 Lien Noteholders to Change Their Votes from Rejecting to Accepting the Debtors’ Proposed Plan of Reorganization at 1-2, In re MPM Silicones,
LLC, 518 B.R. 740 (No. 14-22503-rdd), ECF No. 1004.

68.

The Arch Coal deathtrap is discussed in Section IV.C.1.
69. See infra Section II.B.
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1. The Rise of Restructuring and Plan Support Agreements
A�er occasional use in the 1980s and 90s, 70 RSAs and PSAs began to proliferate in the early 2000s. The Delaware courts encountered these agreements
for the ﬁrst time in 2002. 71 Since 2010, RSAs have become increasingly prevalent. They are now found in most large cases, sometimes negotiated prior to
the case and sometimes negotiated in bankruptcy. If the RSA is ﬁnalized before
the case, the debtor generally asks to be permitted to assume the contract under
bankruptcy’s executory-contract provision; 72 if it is ﬁnalized during the case,
the parties treat it as a settlement. 73
Why the rise of RSAs? One obvious reason is the much more compressed
timeline of current bankruptcy cases than during the early years of the Bankruptcy Code. The going-concern value of a troubled ﬁrm evaporates more
quickly than in the past, and creditors routinely use their leverage to hasten the
restructuring process. 74 The early Chapter 11 cases o�en took years to complete, and critics complained that courts’ willingness to extend repeatedly the
debtor’s exclusive right to ﬁle a reorganization plan exacerbated this tendency. 75 As creditors began using the terms of debtor-in-possession ﬁnancing
agreements and other contracts to speed up the case, and as fewer companies
ﬁt the old “bricks-and-mortar” pattern, debtors’ ability to chart a leisurely
course in bankruptcy disappeared.76 Under pressure to emerge from bankrupt70.

Agreements in In re Texaco Inc., 81 B.R. 813, 814-15 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988), and In re Kellogg
Square P’ship, 160 B.R. 336, 338 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1993), are early examples, although the
terms “lock-up agreement,” “plan support agreement,” and “restructuring agreement” originated later.
71. See In re Indianapolis Downs, LLC., 486 B.R. 286, 295 (Bankr. D. Del. 2013) (discussing In
re NII Holdings, Inc., 288 B.R. 356 (Bankr. D. Del. 2002); and In re Stations Holding Co.,
No. 02-10882 (MFW), 2002 WL 31947022 (Bankr. D. Del. 2002)).
72.
73.
74.
75.

11 U.S.C. § 365 (2018).
FED. R. BANKR. P. 9019.
See David A. Skeel, Jr., Creditors’ Ball: The ‘New’ New Corporate Governance in Chapter 11, 152
U. PA. L. REV. 917, 921-22 (2003); supra note 24 and accompanying text.

Under 11 U.S.C. § 1121(b) (2018), the debtor has the exclusive right to ﬁle a reorganization
plan for the ﬁrst 120 days of the case. Prior to 2005, there was no limit on the number of
times the bankruptcy judge could extend the exclusivity period (the limit is now eighteen
months). 11 U.S.C. § 1121(d)(2)(A) (2018). The classic critique of the length of early Chapter 11 cases is LoPucki, supra note 23, at 729-31.
76. “[M]any contemporary businesses depend on knowledge and ideas rather than on hard assets. Because these companies’ most important assets can walk out the door at any moment,
they cannot aﬀord to negotiate for months or years toward an eventual restructuring.” Skeel,
supra note 74, at 922 (discussing postpetition ﬁnancing and incentive compensation for
managers as well); see, e.g., Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 24, at 766, 784-85.
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cy quickly, many debtors now put the contours of a potential reorganization in
place before ﬁling for bankruptcy, as part of a “pre-arranged” plan. 77 An RSA
helps lock in these commitments.
Second, and closely related, is the disruptive eﬀect of the emergence of pervasive claims trading. It wouldn’t be quite as essential to lock in creditors’
commitments if a debtor knew it would be dealing with the same body of creditors throughout its Chapter 11 case. But the creditor base is constantly shi�ing
in many current cases. 78 Starting in the late 1980s, the market for distressed
debt mushroomed, 79 and now stands at roughly $773 billion, according to one
measure. 80 An investor can buy or sell a major stake in a corporate debtor almost instantaneously. Absent an RSA, the debtor could not be sure that the
deal it struck with one set of creditors would be honored by subsequent purchasers of these claims. RSAs solve this problem by contractually obligating
any subsequent purchaser of claims to honor an RSA joined by the predecessor. 81
These features of RSAs can be seen as mildly distorting Chapter 11 voting,
since the signatories precommit to a future reorganization plan and will not be
able to make a fresh decision whether to approve the plan when it is formally
proposed. But the distortion is relatively limited, and Chapter 11 explicitly contemplates that the debtor may secure votes on a potential reorganization prior
to bankruptcy. 82
Some of the additional tools used by debtors to persuade investors to join
an RSA in more recent cases are substantially more distortive. 83 One standard
inducement is a fee paid to creditors who sign the RSA. O�en called a support
or commitment fee, the fee is characterized as compensation to the creditor for
77.

Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Chapter 11 at Twilight, 56 STAN. L. REV. 673, 67879 (2003).

78.

See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Antibankruptcy, 119 YALE L.J. 648, 652
(2010). For evidence that the instability is not quite as great as many think, see Ellias, supra
note 27, at 774.
See, e.g., Harner, supra note 29, at 710 n.22 (suggesting the expansion began a�er the 1987
stock-market crash).
Altman & Benhenni, supra note 30, at 23 (estimating the total face value of distressed and
defaulted debt).
Other factors may also contribute to RSAs’ popularity. A top bankruptcy lawyer recently
told me that he thinks herd behavior among bankruptcy lawyers and ﬁnancial advisors’
preference for a contractual arrangement have contributed to the spread of RSAs. Interview
with James Sprayregen, Restructuring Partner, Kirkland & Ellis LLP (Jan. 7, 2020).
11 U.S.C. § 1125(g) (2018).

79.
80.
81.

82.
83.

Note that RSAs may raise other concerns, such as silencing of potential objections. But my
concern here is voting distortions.
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waiving her right to object to a proposed reorganization plan based on the
RSA. The fee may also compensate creditors’ lawyers and other professionals
for their eﬀorts in negotiating the RSA. Because these fees ensure a greater
payout for creditors who sign the RSA than those who do not, they introduce a
distortion into Chapter 11 voting. The higher payout oﬀered to signatories than
nonsignatories creates pressure for creditors to join the RSA.
Some RSAs add a further nudge by making their beneﬁts “exploding,”
oﬀering the fee only to creditors who sign up within a speciﬁed time period—
say, within thirty days—or by giving larger beneﬁts to those who sign on earlier. The proposed PREPA RSA, for instance, would provide immediate interest
payments for early signatories but a later commencement for creditors who
joined a�er the initial signing period. These features can put additional pressure on creditors to agree to the RSA, and to do so quickly. 84
2. The Expanding Role of Deathtrap Provisions
The early deathtrap plans could be described as “cramdowns on the cheap.”
If a reorganization plan is consensual—that is, every class of creditors and
shareholders votes to approve it—the bankruptcy judge does not need to determine the precise value of the company and whether the priority of each class
has been fully honored. 85 By approving the plan, a class waives these objections.
If one or more classes vote “no,” it is still possible for the plan to be conﬁrmed through the “cramdown” alternative. 86 But cramdown requires the
court to determine the value of the company, because the court is required to
ascertain whether the priority of the objecting class is being respected under
the plan. 87 For the ﬁrst decade a�er the Bankruptcy Code was enacted in 1978,

84.

Where the time pressure is severe, the eﬀect is somewhat similar to the coercive Saturday
Night Special tender oﬀers sometimes made by takeover bidders in the 1960s. For a more
detailed discussion of the analogy, see infra notes 139-140 and accompanying text.

85.

The requirements for conﬁrming a plan consensually are set forth in 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)
(2018), which includes the requirement that every class approve the plan, 11 U.S.C.
§ 1129(a)(8) (2018).
86. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (2018).
87.
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A cramdown cannot be approved unless a court determines that classes higher in priority
than the objecting class are not being overcompensated, and that the objecting class is either
being fully compensated or no lower-priority class is receiving anything. E.g., Case v. L.A.
Lumber Co., 308 U.S. 106, 116-19 (1939) (linking the absolute-priority rule to the “fair and
equitable” requirement). Determining whether absolute priority is satisﬁed requires a valuation of the ﬁrm and of any securities being provided as compensation.
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there was a strong bias toward consensual reorganization, and debtors were
reticent to use the cramdown option. 88
The early deathtraps took advantage of the cramdown option without directly invoking it by proposing to cut oﬀ a class that voted “no.” This strategy
oﬀered two important beneﬁts over a traditional cramdown. First, the deathtrap provision included a carrot—the prospect of a recovery that the target of
the deathtrap (nearly always shareholders) would not otherwise receive—to
encourage the target to vote for the plan. If the equity holders voted “yes,”
there would be no need actually to attempt a cramdown. Second, the oﬀer of
compensation could shape the bankruptcy judge’s perception of the cramdown
proposal if the class did vote “no.” If the class had the option of accepting a
payout, a judge might be more willing to approve a plan that cut them oﬀ entirely. The deathtrap added a “you had your chance” feature to the planconﬁrmation process.
Most of the early deathtraps seem to have been designed to take advantage
of these beneﬁts and to cram down classes of equity—the lowest-priority classes in the priority waterfall—at a time when cramdowns were generally disfavored. 89 Although the aversion to cramming down equity has largely disappeared, deathtraps still are quite commonly used with classes of equity, 90 as
well as with junior creditors. 91 But deathtraps have increasingly migrated up
the priority hierarchy. In Momentive, the deathtrap provision was used with the
senior class of creditors. 92
Like RSAs, deathtraps also have evolved beyond their traditional form. As
Momentive shows, deathtraps now may involve a choice between two compensation alternatives. In addition, individually targeted deathtraps seek to inﬂu-

88.

LoPucki and Whitford noted and criticized this bias in their massive study of large reorganization cases. See Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Corporate Governance in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 669, 682 (1993);
see also Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Preemptive Cram Down, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J.
625 (1991) (arguing that equity could be preemptively crammed down if the debtor is clearly
insolvent).

89.

As discussed in Section II.B, courts were somewhat skeptical at ﬁrst, striking deathtraps
down in two early cases. See In re MCORP Fin., Inc., 137 B.R. 219, 236 (Bankr. S.D. Tex.
1992); In re Allegheny Int’l, Inc., 118 B.R. 282, 304 n.15 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1990).
90. See, e.g., Plan of Reorganization at 19, In re Parker Drilling, No. 18-36958 (MI) (Bankr. S.D.
Tex. Mar. 7, 2019) (oﬀering equity 1.65% of the new stock, subscription rights, and warrants
if the class voted “yes,” and no distribution if they voted “no”).
91.

See, e.g., In re Samson Res. Corp., 590 B.R. 643, 646, 653 (Bankr. D. Del. 2017).
92. See supra Section I.B.
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ence individual creditors by oﬀering them beneﬁts for voting “yes” even when
their class votes “no.” 93
All of these deathtraps are designed to counteract potential obstacles to
conﬁrmation. With shareholders (and in some cases, junior creditors), the concern is that a reorganization plan cannot be conﬁrmed consensually if the equity holders vote “no,” even if the equity appears to be deeply underwater. Given
courts’ willingness to conﬁrm cramdown plans that cut oﬀ equity, this is less
troubling for plan proponents now than in the early years of the Bankruptcy
Code. But the concern has not disappeared altogether. Plan proponents still
would rather pursue a consensual plan than a cramdown given the expense and
uncertainty of the process. 94
With more senior creditors, the principal concern is holdouts, and the most
salient development is the dramatic rise of the distressed-debt market. In the
world envisioned by the dra�ers of the 1978 Code, the creditors with whom the
debtor was negotiating were creditors the debtor had dealt with prior to bankruptcy and in many cases had an ongoing relationship. Today’s bankruptcy cases look very diﬀerent. By the time a substantial debtor ﬁles for bankruptcy,
much of its debt is o�en held by hedge funds and other distressed-debt traders
who have acquired stakes with the intention of using the tools available in the
restructuring process to maximize the return on their investment. One key tool
is bankruptcy’s voting rules. Because a class’s approval requires the support of
two thirds of the debt in the class, a distressed-debt trader that holds one-third
of a class’s debt has veto power over the vote of the class.95 A deathtrap can
sometimes counteract that holdout threat.
I should emphasize the concerns I have highlighted do not necessarily justify the use of deathtraps. They simply explain why deathtraps have emerged. I
turn to whether the new distortive techniques should be permitted in the next
Part.
ii. why is dis tortion tolerated?
Before beginning this inquiry, I should pause to underscore just how puzzling bankruptcy courts’ tolerance of the new distortive techniques is. Elsewhere in the law, attempts to distort a vote or other decisionmaking process are
93.

See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text; infra notes 200-203 and accompanying text
(describing the individually targeted deathtrap in Arch Coal).
94. See In re Zenith Elecs. Corp., 241 B.R. 92, 105 (Bankr. D. Del. 1999).
95.
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See 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c) (2018) (providing that a class has accepted the plan if two thirds in
amount and a majority in number of the creditors in the class vote in favor of the plan).
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routinely condemned, especially if it is obvious how the distortion can be removed. Indeed, we need only look to corporate law—which lies just across the
insolvency line from bankruptcy—to ﬁnd a starkly diﬀerent response to the use
of distortive techniques. The distortion at issue there involved freeze-out mergers, and it arose during precisely the same period as RSAs and deathtrap provisions began to proliferate in bankruptcy.
The simplest way for a parent corporation to freeze out the nonparent
shareholders of a subsidiary is to merge the subsidiary into the parent corporation (or into a newly created sub of the parent) through a traditional merger.
But if the controller holds 90% of the controlled subsidiary’s stock, it can use
Delaware’s short-form merger statute, 96 which does not require a vote and for a
while was subject to much less scrutiny than a traditional merger. 97 To reach
the 90% threshold, a controller may launch a tender oﬀer for the shares of the
subsidiary that the controller does not own. This is where distortion can slip
in. The controller could signiﬁcantly increase its prospects of success by hinting
that shares that are not tendered into the oﬀer will face an unappealing future—a nudge somewhat similar to the strategy used with deathtrap provisions. 98 Rather than permitting this strategy, as bankruptcy courts have done
with RSAs and deathtraps, the Delaware courts decisively acted to end the
practice. They sharply expanded the deﬁnition of impermissible “coercion” and
made clear they would enjoin any tender oﬀer that distorted minority shareholders’ decision whether to tender. 99

96.
97.

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253 (2019).
In Glassman v. Unocal Exploration Corp., 777 A.2d 242, 246 (Del. 2001), the Delaware Supreme Court made clear that short-form mergers would be upheld in the absence of egregious misbehavior. For criticism of the divergent treatment (at that time) of the two approaches to freezeouts, see Guhan Subramanian, Fixing Freezeouts, 115 YALE L.J. 2, 20-21
(2005).

98.

Threatening to freeze out subsequently, at a lower price, any shareholder who did not tender, or to delist any stock that was not tendered, would be especially eﬀective but probably
deemed coercive even under a narrower deﬁnition of coercion. But simply remaining mum
about what would happen to nontendering shares would not be coercive under the traditional deﬁnition and would still create pressure to tender because shareholders might fear
adverse consequences, such as eventual delisting.

99.

In re Pure Res., Inc., S’holders Litig., 808 A.2d 421 (Del. Ch. 2002). In the Pure Resources
case, then-Vice Chancellor Leo Strine announced that a controlling shareholder’s tender
oﬀer would be enjoined as coercive unless it satisﬁed three requirements. The controlling
shareholder must (1) include a nonwaivable condition promising not to go through with the
tender oﬀer unless a majority of the minority shareholders tender their shares; (2) commit
to a prompt short-form merger at the same price as the tender oﬀer if it obtains more than
90% of the shares; and (3) refrain from any threats to shareholders who do not tender. Id. at
445.
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Why have bankruptcy judges responded so diﬀerently? To answer this
question, I begin by considering the structure of bankruptcy law itself, which
leads to a surprising discovery: the Chapter 11 vote was never intended to be
truly neutral. This structural feature of Chapter 11, along with several other features of the new distortive techniques, suggests that the techniques are not always pernicious, or so I argue in Section II.B.
A. The Baseline Is Not Neutral.
If the Chapter 11 vote were an ordinary vote, the new distortive techniques
would be deeply problematic. Deathtraps and RSAs are designed to distort the
vote by nudging, and in some cases, coercing the parties to support the plan.
This is precisely what we try to prevent in ordinary voting processes.
But if we take a closer look at the structure of Chapter 11, it turns out the
Chapter 11 vote is not designed to be an ordinary vote. The baseline is not neutral. To the contrary, Chapter 11 is subtly biased toward conﬁrmation of a reorganization plan at each stage of the case. This does not mean that most cases
will result in conﬁrmed reorganization plans, of course. But the baseline is tilted toward conﬁrmation, which puts the new distortive techniques in a very
diﬀerent light.
Start with the beginning of a case. When a debtor ﬁles for bankruptcy, it is
nearly impossible for creditors to reverse the ﬁling and restore the status quo.
Although creditors sometimes do challenge the ﬁling, arguing that the debtor
has entered bankruptcy in bad faith, these objections usually fail.100 Absent an
admission by the debtor’s managers that the company really does not need to
be in bankruptcy, the debtor is permitted to remain in bankruptcy, even if it
appears to be solvent when the bankruptcy petition is ﬁled. 101 Unlike with
mergers or other fundamental corporate transactions, which can be stopped if
shareholders vote “no,” neither shareholders nor creditors have an opportunity
to thwart a bankruptcy ﬁling.
Once the debtor has entered bankruptcy, the process moves toward a vote
that is implicitly coercive. Even if the debtor proposes a traditional reorganiza100.

For a discussion of the early case law, see Lawrence Ponoroﬀ & F. Stephen Knippenberg, The
Implied Good Faith Filing Requirement: Sentinel of an Evolving Bankruptcy Policy, 85 NW. U. L.
REV. 919, 924-27, 933-37 (1991).
101. SGL Carbon was the rare exception. The company issued a press release proclaiming that it
was “ﬁnancially healthy” and had ﬁled for bankruptcy solely to resolve “excessive . . . demands” by the plaintiﬀs in antitrust litigation. In re SGL Carbon Corp., 200 F.3d
154, 157 (3d Cir. 1999). The Third Circuit held that “ﬁling . . . merely to obtain tactical litigation advantages” did not constitute good faith. Id. at 165.
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tion plan, the proposed payout to a particular class may be backed by an implicit threat to cram down the class involuntarily if it votes “no.” This threat is
particularly potent with lower-priority creditors and shareholders, since they
risk receiving nothing in a cramdown if the debtor is deeply insolvent. So if the
plan oﬀers to give shareholders warrants to purchase stock in the newly reorganized company, for instance, shareholders know that the debtor may simply
ask the court to approve a cramdown plan that cuts them oﬀ altogether if they
vote “no.”
A traditional plan also carries the implicit threat that if creditors vote “no”
the debtor will convert the case to Chapter 7, and the company will be liquidated. 102 In a piecemeal liquidation, creditors may receive considerably less than if
the company is reorganized or sold through a going-concern sale.
To be sure, creditors—especially creditors on whom the debtor depends—
are not helpless against these features of Chapter 11. The debtor-in-possession
ﬁnancer may insist that the debtor sell its assets in a bankruptcy sale rather
than going through a full-blown Chapter 11 reorganization. 103 Creditors also
may give the debtor’s managers performance-based compensation to incentivize a prompt, eﬀective reorganization. 104 But the Chapter 11 process itself is coercive.
Thus far, I have focused on Chapter 11’s bias toward conﬁrming a reorganization plan, without attempting to explain why Chapter 11 has this bias. Historically, lawmakers (prodded by restructuring professionals) were concerned
about holdout creditors interfering with a beneﬁcial restructuring; 105 this was
the rationale for including a vote that would bind objecting creditors. Further,
the legislative history of the current Bankruptcy Code indicates that Congress
believed reorganization is o�en preferable to liquidation, because it better preserves value for creditors and jobs for employees.106 In my view, the nudge to102.

See 11 U.S.C. § 1112(a) (2018) (giving the debtor broad discretion to convert a Chapter 11
case to Chapter 7).

103.

See, e.g., Skeel, supra note 74, at 926 n.34 (describing the FAO Schwartz and United Airlines
bankruptcies).

104.

Id. at 926-28.
See, e.g., Lloyd K. Garrison, Corporate Reorganization Under the Federal Bankruptcy Power, 19
VA. L. REV. 317, 317-18 (1933) (advocating for the codiﬁcation of large-scale corporate reorganization).

105.

106.

See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 220 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6179
(“The purpose of a business reorganization case . . . is to restructure a business’s ﬁnances so
that it may continue to operate, provide its employees with jobs, pay its creditors, and produce a return for its stockholders. The premise of a business reorganization is that assets
that are used for production in the industry for which they were designed are more valuable
than those same assets sold for scrap.”).
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ward conﬁrmation is defensible on normative grounds, 107 in addition to being
consistent both with the structure of Chapter 11 and with lawmakers’ intent.
B. The Case for Permitting (Some) Distortion
Bankruptcy’s nonneutral baseline seems to be a key reason for bankruptcy
judges’ willingness to allow the distortive techniques. At the outset, however,
some were skeptical. In Allegheny International, for instance, the court declined
to enforce a provision in the reorganization plan providing that if any class of
shareholders voted “no,” it and any lower-priority class of shareholders would
not receive any recovery. 108 “[T]here is no authority in the Bankruptcy Code,”
the court concluded, “for discriminating against classes who vote against a plan
of reorganization.” 109 Two years later, another bankruptcy court—in what
seems to be the ﬁrst case to use the term “deathtrap”—rejected a somewhat
similar provision that would have denied any recovery to three classes of shareholders if the ﬁrst shareholder class voted against the plan. 110 The court concluded that this provision “results in the plan[] not being fair and equitable.” 111
By the end of the decade, a Delaware bankruptcy judge found nothing
problematic about a provision promising new debentures to a class of bondholders if they voted in favor of the plan, but no recovery if they rejected it. Using almost identical language as the earlier cases, but inserting the word “no,”
the court said:
There is no prohibition in the Code against a Plan proponent oﬀering diﬀerent treatment to a class depending on whether it votes to accept or reject the Plan. One justiﬁcation for such disparate treatment is
that, if the class accepts, the Plan proponent is saved the expense and
uncertainty of a cramdown ﬁght. 112

107.

One caveat: I would deﬁne the objective as achieving an eﬃcient resolution of ﬁnancial distress, rather than treating reorganization as inherently good in itself, as some of the legislative history does. The bias toward conﬁrmation seems fully compatible with eﬃcient resolution, in part because it counteracts strategic behavior.

108.

In re Allegheny Int’l, Inc., 118 B.R. 282, 304 n.15 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1990).
109. Id.
110.
111.

112.
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In re MCorp Fin., Inc., 137 B.R. 219, 236 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1992).
Id. In the Drexel Burnham bankruptcy, by contrast, the court upheld a plan provision that
oﬀered warrants to classes that accepted the plan but nothing if they rejected. In re Drexel
Burnham Lambert Grp., Inc., 140 B.R. 347, 350 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992).
In re Zenith Elecs. Corp., 241 B.R. 92, 105 (Bankr. D. Del. 1999) (emphasis added) (citation
and footnote omitted).
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Put another way: since the deathtrap plan was simply incorporating the
eﬀect of a possible cramdown into a consensual plan, it was no more coercive
than a Chapter 11 cramdown already is and should not be seen as problematic.
Although this logic may justify a traditional deathtrap provision, it does not
explain courts’ willingness to permit other distortive techniques, such as signing-fee RSAs or individually targeted deathtraps. Several leading bankruptcy
scholars have in fact essentially proposed that signing-fee RSAs be banned.113
But the nature of current bankruptcy practice and of the distortive techniques
themselves suggests the need for a more nuanced approach even to these techniques.
First, given the dramatic change in bankruptcy practice discussed earlier,
the new distortive techniques can be seen as restoring the balance—with its tilt
toward conﬁrmation—contemplated in the structure of the Bankruptcy Code.
RSAs make a speedy reorganization more feasible and counteract the destabilizing eﬀect of claims trading on the creditor base. If RSA fees are o�en used to
co-opt problematic holdouts, 114 they may at least sometimes be defensible,
even if mildly oﬀensive, for much the same reason as vote buying is sometimes
permitted in corporate law. 115 The same logic also applies to deathtrap provisions. 116
Second, Chapter 11 is not designed to pick a single, most-favored result, as
votes in many other contexts are. The vote in a large case consists of numerous
diﬀerent votes, one for each class of creditors or shareholders. Rather than selecting a single optimal outcome, the votes are designed as a check on the larger
renegotiation process. 117
Third, creditors in a Chapter 11 case are not as vulnerable to prisoners’ dilemma concerns as shareholders deciding how to respond to a tender oﬀer outside of bankruptcy. The creditors are much less widely scattered. The bond

113.
114.
115.
116.

117.

According to these scholars, payments to signatories should be viewed as a “badge of opportunism.” Janger & Levitin, supra note 16, at 169.
Ironically, the same voting rules that were originally put in place to discipline holdouts now
invite holdouts, due to how high they are set.
See Schreiber v. Carney, 447 A.2d 17, 22-26 (Del. Ch. 1982) (approving vote buying when the
transaction was approved by shareholders).
Notice also that, unlike with a tender oﬀer, investors who decline the proposed treatment in
the context of a deathtrap with diﬀerential consideration will not retain their existing interest in the company. Their interest, like the interest of investors who vote “yes,” will be transformed.
Consider, by way of contrast, the vote on a merger or other fundamental transaction in corporate law. These votes o�en have an up-or-down quality similar to that of votes in other
contexts.
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debt of a publicly held company tends to be much more concentrated than
stock, and ﬁrst and second liens generally are concentrated as well. 118 Even if
creditors were widely scattered, unsecured creditors are represented by a creditors’ committee a�er the Chapter 11 case is ﬁled. 119 As a result, creditors can
more easily coordinate than shareholders confronted with a coercive tender
oﬀer can—or the prisoners operating in a prisoners’ dilemma game can.
Fourth, the creditors who negotiate an RSA may incur very real costs that
are not borne by creditors who are not involved in the negotiations. The principal costs are the fees of a signatory’s bankruptcy lawyers and ﬁnancial advisors. There may also be other costs, such as the cost of forgoing trading while
the parties are negotiating the terms of the RSA and being subject to nondisclosure obligations. An RSA fee may compensate these creditors for some of
their costs, and in doing so reduces the extent to which other creditors can freeride on the negotiations of signatories to the agreement.
Finally, we also need to consider how the parties would respond if all voting distortions were banned. One obvious possibility is that some distressed
debtors that might otherwise reorganize under Chapter 11 would now be unable to do so, and would be forced to resolve their distress through a sale of assets instead. 120 To be sure, asset sales are sometimes an eﬀective solution to a
debtor’s ﬁnancial distress. 121 But there is less democracy in an asset sale, not
more, since debtors’ creditors and shareholders do not have any vote at all in an
asset sale. 122 And a ban on distortive techniques could lead to more sales in cases where sales are ineﬃcient, and the traditional Chapter 11 process would produce a superior result. 123
118.

See generally Marcel Kahan, The Qualiﬁed Case Against Mandatory Terms in Bonds, 89 Nw. U.
L. REV. 565, 584 (1994) (noting the high concentration of bond holdings).
119. See 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a) (2018) (requiring the United States Trustee to appoint a committee
of creditors holding unsecured claims).
120. Sales of assets have been a common alternative to the traditional Chapter 11 process in the
past several decades. See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 77, at 675 & n.6 (discussing the rise
of sales).
121.

See, e.g., Meier & Servaes, supra note 38, at 4231 (ﬁnding that the welfare loss of sales is lower than is o�en thought).

122.

The provision governing asset sales is 11 U.S.C. § 363(b) (2018), which requires only that
the court authorize the sale a�er notice and a hearing. For discussion of the additional safeguards courts tend to apply, see Mark J. Roe & David A. Skeel, Jr., Assessing the Chrysler
Bankruptcy, 108 MICH. L. REV. 727, 739-41 (2010).

123.

The classic context in which traditional Chapter 11 may be superior to a sale is where the
highest-valuing potential purchasers are themselves ﬁnancially distressed. See Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Liquidation Values and Debt Capacity: A Market Equilibrium Approach,
47 J. FIN. 1343, 1344 (1992).
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It might be possible to achieve some of the beneﬁts of the new distortive
techniques while limiting their distortion of the voting process. Under existing
law, bankruptcy courts can award compensation to a creditor that makes a
“substantial contribution in a case.” 124 Courts could use this provision to reward creditors who perform the public good of negotiating a reorganization
plan, while banning RSA fees. The problem with this approach is that it replicates only some of the beneﬁts of the distortive technique. Perhaps most importantly, it would remove the debtor’s ability to use RSA fees to counteract the
threat of holdouts.
I do not mean to suggest there is no reason for concern about the new distortive techniques. There is. But the potential beneﬁts of counteracting holdout
problems and reducing free-riding, as well as creditors’ ability to coordinate,
suggest that distortive techniques should be scrutinized in a more nuanced
fashion, not simply disallowed.
An analogy to corporate law may once again be helpful. Courts were initially quite skeptical of corporate voting agreements, o�en striking them down for
interfering with directorial functions or on other grounds. 125 As courts recognized the potential beneﬁts of voting arrangements, which are loosely analogous to those of RSAs, the hostility to these arrangements began to dissipate.
Courts adopted a more nuanced approach, enforcing most voting agreements
in close corporations but striking down agreements that appear to be pernicious. 126
iii. rules of thumb for the new distortive techniques
I have argued thus far that the distortions in current bankruptcy practice
can be problematic but sometimes serve a valuable function. It would therefore
be a mistake simply to outlaw the distortions altogether.
How should bankruptcy judges determine which distortive techniques to
permit? The current approach has a “know-it-when-I-see-it” quality: the
courts have approved most deathtraps and RSAs but occasionally strike one
124.

11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(3)(D) (2018).

125.

See, e.g., McQuade v. Stoneham, 189 N.E. 234, 237 (N.Y. 1934) (striking down the voting
agreement because it would interfere with directors’ oversight role).

126.

See, e.g., Galler v. Galler, 203 N.E.2d 577, 587 (Ill. 1964) (upholding shareholder agreement);
Zion v. Kurtz, 405 N.E.2d 681, 684 (N.Y. 1980) (same). But see Puro v. Puro, 393 N.Y.S.2d
633, 637 (Sup. Ct. 1976) (declining to enforce a provision requiring appointment of a particular person as director where the person had committed misconduct). For an extensive
survey of cases, see 1 AM. BAR ASS’N, MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT ANNOTATED 7-254
to -261 (4th ed. 2008).
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down if it seems excessive. In this Part, I outline four rules of thumb that might
provide additional structure to courts’ analysis. I conclude by considering
whether creditors should be permitted to change their votes when their vote
was shaped by distortive techniques.
A. Are Holdouts Present (or Likely)?
We tend to assume that coercion is pernicious and should always be rooted
out. But coercion can sometimes be beneﬁcial.127 The prisoner’s dilemma itself
is perhaps the best illustration. Few would argue that the threat of a higher
prison sentence if a criminal defendant declines to confess, as in the prisoner’s
dilemma, should be prohibited. 128 The Bankruptcy Code veers into somewhat
similar terrain by including liquidation and cramdown options, each of which
nudge the parties toward approval of a proposed reorganization plan.
Each of bankruptcy’s new distortive techniques can sometimes be justiﬁed
in these terms. As we have seen, an RSA streamlines the reorganization process
and reduces the risk that initial support for a plan will dissolve as potentially
supportive creditors sell their claims to buyers who may view the claims diﬀerently. An RSA also may discourage problematic holdout behavior, especially if
it gives a support fee to signatories. Deathtraps can also serve beneﬁcial functions by helping counteract holdout behavior. Traditional deathtraps are essentially a simpliﬁed form of cramdown.
The potential for distortive techniques to counteract potential problems
suggests an initial rule of thumb: courts should ask whether the distortion is in
fact playing this role—whether it counteracts a potential threat to the reorganization process. 129 To be sure, bankruptcy judges already have the option of disqualifying votes cast in bad faith. If a creditor’s behavior is clearly designed to
obstruct the reorganization process, a judge can invalidate its vote. 130 But this
is a blunt tool. Holdout creditors o�en do not telegraph their intention to torpedo the process, and the line between aggressive bargaining and destructively
127.

For a classic analysis of the complexities of coercion and the importance of the baseline from
which it is assessed, see Peter Westen, “Freedom” and “Coercion”—Virtue Words and Vice
Words, 1985 DUKE L.J. 541, 558-89.
128. I borrow this example from an excellent article by Susan Kuo and Benjamin Means. Susan S.
Kuo & Benjamin Means, Collective Coercion, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1599, 1603-04, 1604 n.18 (2016).
129. My use of the term “threat” is not altogether coincidental. It echoes a key feature of Delaware’s takeover jurisprudence. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petrol. Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954-55
(Del. 1985).
130.
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See 11 U.S.C. § 1126(e) (2018) (authorizing courts to “designate” votes not cast in good
faith).
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holding out is fuzzy. A distortive technique is a less draconian response to
holdout behavior.
In some cases, there may be an identiﬁable, strategically minded holdout
creditor. The Momentive senior lenders, whom the district court judge described as using their intercreditor agreement as “a sword to enable the [lenders] to work around the Bankruptcy Code,” may be an example. 131 An RSA or a
deathtrap provision can be justiﬁed as a means of diminishing such creditors’
incentive to hold out.
Suppose no identiﬁable holdout creditor has emerged. How might a court
gauge the likelihood of a threat to the reorganization process? One obvious
proxy for the threat of holdout behavior is a liquid claims-trading market for
the company’s debt. If claims are actively traded, distressed-debt traders can
easily take a blocking position in any given class of debt. Courts should be open
to distortive techniques in this context.
If there is no identiﬁable holdout creditor and claims are not actively traded, by contrast, distortive techniques are less justiﬁed. This will o�en be the
case with small or midsized debtors, for instance, or with large debtors if the
bankruptcy judge has imposed a freeze on claims trading. If a particular class of
claims is not actively traded, this also may weigh against permitting distortive
techniques, even if there is a vibrant market for claims of other classes.
Beyond looking for identiﬁable holdout creditors and actively traded claims
markets, courts should also consider a creditor’s holdings in other classes. In
many large cases, some creditors hold claims in multiple classes, and these
crossholdings can increase a creditor’s incentive to hold out. Similarly, a creditor that has a substantial claim against one subsidiary might implicitly threaten
to thwart the reorganization of the parent unless the subsidiary claim is given
disproportionately favorable treatment. The debtor might also be justiﬁed in
using a deathtrap or RSA to counter this holdout threat.
In most large corporate bankruptcies, the risk of problematic holdout behavior will be signiﬁcant. But if holdouts are unlikely to be a major concern,
the court should police distortive techniques much more aggressively.

131.

In re MPM Silicones, L.L.C., 596 B.R. 416, 449 (S.D.N.Y. 2019).

397

the yale law journal

130:366

2020

B. How Coercive Is the Distortive Technique?
The extent of the holdout risk needs to be considered jointly with a second
factor, the coerciveness of the distortive technique. 132 If the holdout risk is severe, a more coercive technique may be justiﬁed; if not, it is not. 133
The simplest RSAs and traditional deathtraps are at the weak end of the coercion spectrum. An RSA that does not include a signing bonus or other inducement, as with the ResCap PSA discussed earlier, commits signatories to
supporting a reorganization plan that accords with the terms of the RSA. To be
sure, this commitment is mildly coercive, but it is justiﬁed by the need to ensure that subsequent claims trading does not undermine the deal that has been
put in place. 134
Traditional deathtraps are analogous to a simple RSA. In a traditional
deathtrap, all of the creditors (or shareholders) in the class receive a payout if
the class votes “yes,” and all of them receive nothing if they vote “no.” A traditional deathtrap is coercive, but only weakly so. From the perspective of the
creditors in the class, it is an assurance game rather than a prisoner’s dilemma. 135 If the payout is too low, the class can reject it. To be sure, the class does
run the risk of receiving nothing if it votes “no,” but this simply reﬂects the
structure of Chapter 11—the baseline is not neutral, as we have seen. The coerciveness of a simple RSA or traditional deathtrap is limited. Each should be
permitted unless there is little or no risk of holdouts.
A signing-fee RSA is more coercive. Because joiners receive diﬀerent—and
higher—overall consideration than those who do not join, there is greater pressure for creditors to join, akin to a structurally coercive tender oﬀer in corporate

132.

133.

Oscar Couwenberg and Stephen Lubben also have noted the possibility of coercion with
RSAs. Oscar Couwenberg & Stephen J. Lubben, Private Beneﬁts Without Control? Modern
Chapter 11 and the Market for Corporate Control, 13 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 145, 166
(2018).

The ﬁrst two rules of thumb are somewhat similar to the two prongs of the Unocal test in
corporate law, which applies when the directors of a target corporation use defensive
measures. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 953.
134. Moreover, it is not clear that most RSAs are truly binding. At least one top bankruptcy lawyer almost never seeks court approval of RSAs in his cases, based on his view that parties
generally honor RSAs but would not be legally bound if they withdrew from the RSA due to
changed circumstances. Interview with James Sprayregen, supra note 81.
135. Kuo & Means, supra note 128, at 1614-15. In an assurance game, “all players can win by cooperating” and assuring each other that they will play the riskier and mutually preferred strategy. Id. at 1615; see also Richard H. McAdams, Beyond the Prisoners’ Dilemma: Coordination,
Game Theory, and Law, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 209, 220-22 (2009) (providing an illustration of an
assurance game).
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law. 136 The inclusion of a fee alters creditors’ entitlements, since it means they
will get one payout if they sign the RSA (their pro rata recovery plus the fee)
and another if they do not (just their pro rata recovery). As a result, even a
creditor who believes the payout proposed by the RSA is too low may feel pressured to join, lest she be le� with the worst possible outcome: enough of her
fellow creditors join the RSA to provide a vote in favor of the proposed reorganization plan, and she doesn’t get the RSA fee. 137
Some RSAs add procedural coercion to the entitlement coercion created by
a fee. These exploding RSAs may require creditors to join quickly—say, within
two weeks—or encourage creditors to join early by promising interim payments that begin as soon as the creditor joins. 138 An RSA that couples a fee
with a short joinder period calls to mind the old Saturday Night Special tender
oﬀers that gave shareholders very little time to decide whether to tender their
shares and were made available on a ﬁrst-come, ﬁrst-served basis. 139 Saturday
Night Specials were banned a few years a�er they emerged. 140
RSAs can create another form of procedural coercion as well—they can cut
oﬀ other parties’ and the court’s access to information. If the RSA forbids signatories from criticizing the reorganization plan, it could silence a potentially
136.

In a structurally coercive tender oﬀer, the bidder tenders for some or all of the shares of a
target corporation and signals that shareholders who do not tender will be subject to a
freezeout at a lower price or will ﬁnd their shares devalued in other ways. This can give
shareholders an incentive to tender even if they believe the oﬀer is inadequate, since they
fear the even worse treatment they will receive if enough of their fellow shareholders tender
into the oﬀer and the bidder ends up with control. Delaware signaled its disapproval of
structurally coercive tender oﬀers in Unocal, 493 A.2d at 956, and blatant two-tier tender
oﬀers largely disappeared therea�er. See also In re Pure Res., Inc., S’holders Litig., 808 A.2d
421, 445-47 (Del. Ch. 2002) (making clear that more subtle variations on the strategy—such
as manipulating the majority of the minority requirement—also will be treated as improperly coercive).

137.

Fees that are available only to a limited subgroup of creditors also may give a windfall to
these creditors. See infra Section IV.C.2 (discussing the Peabody Energy case).

138.

The Peabody Energy RSA is an example of the former and the PREPA RSA of the latter. They
are discussed in Sections IV.C.2 and IV.A, respectively.

139.

A bidder might make a tender oﬀer for 50% of the shares, for instance, and end the oﬀer as
soon as 50% of shares had been tendered, excluding shareholders who tendered later.

140.

The Williams Act of 1968 outlawed Saturday Night Specials by requiring that tender oﬀers
treat late joiners the same as early joiners. Williams Act, Pub. L. No. 90-439, § 3(d)(7), 82
Stat. 454, 457 (1968) (codiﬁed as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). The Securities
and Exchange Commission promulgated regulations under the Williams Act that required
tender oﬀers be held open for at least twenty days. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-1 (2019). For an
overview of the Williams Act changes, see, for example, Note, The Developing Meaning of
“Tender Oﬀer” Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1250, 1254-60
(1973).
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important source of information—especially if the signatories are sophisticated
parties and nonsignatories less so. 141 The court should consider the informational impact when assessing the coerciveness of an RSA.
As with RSAs, deathtrap provisions can take more coercive forms. Under
the plan of adjustment initially proposed for Puerto Rico, for instance, bondholders whose debt had been challenged as unconstitutional were given a
choice either to accept a 35% payout or reject the payout and litigate the constitutionality of their debt, with the prospect of receiving a higher payout if they
succeeded and nothing if they lost. 142 Rather than all receiving the same consideration, the creditors who accepted the payout would receive diﬀerent consideration than those who rejected it. 143
The larger the fee or diﬀerential compensation is in relation to the amount
of a creditor’s claim, the more coercive it will be. Suppose a creditor has a $100
claim, the total amount of claims in the creditor’s class is $1000, and the creditor believes that $600 for the class (thus, $60 for her claim) would be an appropriate recovery: she would vote “yes” if the reorganization plan oﬀered her
class at least $600 or “no” if it oﬀered less. If the debtor were negotiating an
RSA that oﬀered $400 to the class and a 2.5% fee to each creditor who signed
the RSA, the 2.5% fee would not be especially coercive. The creditor would receive less than other creditors in her class if she declined to sign and the plan
eventually was approved, but the diﬀerence would not be substantial.144 If the
RSA oﬀered $400 and a 15% fee, by contrast, the RSA would be much more
coercive. Although the creditor’s potential recovery ($55) would be less than
what she considers fair, if she voted “no” and a suﬃciently high majority of her
fellow creditors voted “yes,” she would be stuck with a far inferior recovery
($40). Faced with this prospect, she might sign the RSA, despite believing that
the oﬀer is inadequate. Notice that the fee would be even more coercive if the
debtor structured it as a ﬁxed total amount ($150) rather than a percentage,

141.

For discussion of this concern with RSAs, see Baird, supra note 16, at 617-19, which concludes that the silencing was not problematic in the cases under discussion.

142.

See Title III Joint Plan of Adjustment of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, et al. at 3-4, In
re Fin. Oversight Mgmt. Bd., No. 17-BK-3283-LTS (D.P.R. Sept. 27, 2019) (deﬁning “2014
CW Bond Settlement” and “2014 Settling CW Bond Distribution”).
143. Although individually targeted deathtraps may seem to directly violate Chapter 11, they actually do not. Chapter 11 requires that every member of a class of creditors be given the same
consideration. 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(4) (2018). But the stricture is waived if a creditor agrees
to the divergent consideration. Id. If the individually targeted deathtrap gives creditors a
choice, it technically satisﬁes this requirement.
144.
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Assuming the plan was approved, the creditor would receive $42.50 ($40 plus a $2.50 fee) if
she voted “yes” and $40 if she voted “no.”
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since signatories would receive amounts not claimed by other creditors in the
class. 145
Deathtraps can create the same issues of entitlement coercion as RSA
fees. 146 The larger the diﬀerence in compensation is in comparison to the size
of a creditor’s claim, the more coercive the deathtrap will be. And if compensation is structured as a pool of compensation, rather than a ﬁxed amount for
each creditor that votes “yes,” the coercion increases.
In each context, the fee will be more coercive if the signing protocol also includes procedural coercion. An exploding RSA will be more coercive than an
RSA that does not favor early joiners or provides only a brief opportunity to
join.
C. The Presence of Independent Justiﬁcations
The third factor that sometimes comes into play is the presence of independent justiﬁcations for the distortive technique. If the RSA or deathtrap responds to the risk of problematic holdouts and is not coercive, the court may
not need to consider the third rule of thumb. But in borderline cases, the presence or absence of independent justiﬁcations can be quite important.
The creditors who negotiate the terms of an RSA—and thus the terms of a
potential reorganization plan—provide a public good, since reorganization may
be valuable for everyone, and they also forgo the opportunity to trade during
the negotiations. The dra�ers of the Bankruptcy Code assumed the creditors’
committee would play this role, rather than individual creditors. 147 But in current cases, the creditors’ committee o�en is not the principal locus of negotiations, because, among other reasons, distressed-debt funds may prefer to form
their own ad hoc committees, or the “fulcrum” class—the class that will be converted into equity post-reorganization—is a class of lien creditors rather than
145.

Suppose, for instance, that if the creditor joins the RSA, the RSA will have 80% ($800) of
support in the class. The creditors with $800 worth of claims would share the $150 pool,
which means that the creditor would receive an $18.75 fee ($100/$800 x $150) on account of
her $100 claim, rather than the $15 she would receive if the fee were 15%. In this case, the
creditor would receive $58.50 if she joined the RSA, and $40 if she did not, if the plan were
ultimately approved.
146. Procedural coercion is less o�en an issue with deathtraps because bankruptcy law regulates
the voting process. Bankruptcy procedure rules require that creditors be given at least twenty-eight days’ notice of the disclosure-statement hearing, FED. R. BANKR. P. 3017(a), and
bankruptcy courts generally give them several weeks to vote a�er the disclosure statement
and ballots have been distributed.
147.

See, e.g., David A. Skeel, Jr., The Nature and Eﬀect of Corporate Voting in Chapter 11 Reorganization Cases, 78 VA. L. REV. 461, 525-28 (1992).
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the general creditors represented by the creditors’ committee. 148 If the RSA fee
is available to all creditors, even those that did not contribute to the negotiations, the public-good justiﬁcation is weaker for the later-joining creditors,
even though they too bear some costs, such as the obligation to bind any transfers of their claim to the RSA. Moreover, a more inclusive RSA fee reduces the
risk that the fee will be used to reward creditors that are in a position to extract
private beneﬁts.
Courts’ treatment of breakup fees outside of bankruptcy provides useful insight into how these beneﬁts and costs can be incorporated into the analysis.
Breakup fees are typically promised by a target corporation as compensation to
the bidder if a proposed acquisition fails to go through, either because another
bidder emerges or the shareholders of the target reject the acquisition. 149 Outside of bankruptcy, courts generally allow breakup fees in merger transactions
if the fee is no more than three to four percent of the overall value of the
deal. 150 Courts have not established a single set of guidelines for breakup fees
in bankruptcy, 151 but they generally have limited breakup fees to one to three
148.

Indeed, the dynamics of large-scale corporate reorganization have changed so much that a
lively debate has emerged as to whether creditors’ committees should even be appointed in
every case. See, e.g., Christopher S. Sontchi & Bruce Grohsgal, Should the Appointment of a
Committee of Unsecured Creditors’ Committee Be Made Optional in Chapter 11?, 38 AM. BANKR.
INST. J. 12 (2019).
149. There is a robust scholarly literature on breakups and other forms of “lockups.” For lockups
in corporate law, see, for example, John C. Coates IV & Guhan Subramanian, A Buy-Side
Model of M&A Lockups: Theory and Evidence, 53 STAN. L. REV. 307 (2000). For lockups in
bankruptcy, see, for example, Bruce A. Markell, The Case Against Breakup Fees in Bankruptcy,
66 AM. BANKR. L.J. 349 (1992).
150.

E.g., In re Answers Corp. S’holder Litig., No. 6170-VCN, 2012 WL 1253072, at *8 & n.50
(Del. Ch. Apr. 11, 2012); In re Topps Co. S’holder Litig., 926 A.2d 58, 86-87 (Del. Ch. 2007);
see also David Fox, Breakup Fees—Picking Your Number, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Sept. 11, 2012), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2012/09/11/breakup-fees-pickingyour-number [https://perma.cc/Z3PR-J3JA] (“[T]here is a signiﬁcant amount of statistical
data to back up a general proposition that fees ‘usually’ fall in the 3% to 4% range.”); cf. Brazen v. Bell Atl. Corp., 695 A.2d 43, 49 n.17 (Del. 1997) (presenting Delaware case law on
breakup fees).

151.

Three diﬀerent standards for scrutinizing breakup fees have emerged in the bankruptcy
courts. Under the most lenient test, the court assesses a debtor’s request to agree to a
breakup fee under a business-judgment-rule standard. In re Integrated Res., Inc., 147 B.R.
650, 657-58 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). A second group of courts considers the “best interest of the estate.” In re Am. W. Airlines, Inc., 166 B.R. 908, 912-13 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1994) (endorsing the
perspective of Markell, supra note 149). Under the strictest approach, followed by courts in
the Third Circuit, courts consider whether the breakup fee qualiﬁes as an administrative expense, In re O’Brien Envtl. Energy, Inc., 181 F.3d 527, 532-33 (3d Cir. 1999)—that is, whether
the fee was “necessary to preserve the value of the estate,” id. at 535. For further discussion,
see generally Monica E. White, Note, Give Me a Break-Up Fee: In re Reliant Energy Chan-

402

distorted choice in corporate bankruptcy

percent of the proposed purchase price. 152 The best justiﬁcation for permitting
breakup fees, rather than disallowing them altogether, is that they compensate
the bidder for its costs in the event the transaction collapses. At the same time,
breakup fees provide modest protection for the deal favored by the target’s directors, who have agreed to permit a change-in-control transaction. 153
RSA fees loosely resemble breakup fees, but there are several important
diﬀerences between the two: although RSAs sometimes include breakup fees
(structured as a payment in the event the proposed reorganization plan is not
conﬁrmed), standard RSA fees are not compensation in the event the deal fails.
The signatories of an RSA receive the fee when the RSA becomes the basis for a
successful reorganization. RSA fees also directly aﬀect the vote on a proposed
reorganization plan, whereas the eﬀect of a lockup on voting is indirect. Further, RSA fees are designed to address diﬀerent concerns than breakup fees,
such as the risk of holdouts.
Despite these distinctions, the cost to the signatories is nevertheless an appropriate initial yardstick for assessing RSA fees, as with lockups. As noted earlier, the parties who negotiate an RSA are in a sense providing a public good for
other creditors. 154 The signatories may incur two other kinds of costs as well.
They may be precluded from buying or selling claims during periods of active
negotiation, and any purchasers of their existing claims may be constrained by
the terms of the RSA. The signatories also waive their right to object subsequently to a reorganization plan that conforms with the requirements of the
RSA. It may be possible to quantify some of the costs of committing to the
RSA—by tracking changes in the value of claims during the period of the negotiations, for instance. But even if the less tangible costs cannot be quantiﬁed,

nelview LP and the Third Circuit’s Improper Rejection of a Bankruptcy Bid Protection Provision,
48 HOUS. L. REV. 659 (2011), which argues for the business-judgment-rule approach.
152.

See, e.g., AgriProcessors, Inc. v. Fokkena (In re Tama Beef Packing, Inc.), 321 B.R. 496, 498
(B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2005) (noting that breakup fees are “usually limited to one to four percent
of the purchase price”); In re Dura Auto. Sys., Inc., No. 06-11202 (KJC), 2007 WL 7728109,
at *91 (Bankr. D. Del. Aug. 15, 2007) (noting that past breakup fees approved by the court
have generally been between 2% and 3%); 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 363.02[7] (16th ed.
2019) (concluding that courts typically limit breakup fees to 3% of the deal value, although
they “have approved higher amounts, up to about 5 percent of the consideration, in unusual
circumstances”).

153.

See, e.g., David A. Skeel, Jr., A Reliance Damages Approach to Corporate Lockups, 90 NW. U. L.
REV. 564, 574 (1996). For an argument that breakup fees should be more tightly constrained, see Coates & Subramanian, supra note 149, at 376-77.
154. See supra text accompanying note 147. Note that this role is somewhat analogous to serving
on a creditors’ committee. There, attorneys’ fees are paid but the creditors’ opportunity costs
are not compensated.
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they should be taken into account when a court determines whether and to
what extent to approve an RSA fee.
Other independent justiﬁcations can be analyzed in somewhat analogous
terms. If a proposed reorganization plan includes a diﬀerential deathtrap that
requires creditors who vote “yes” to agree to waive potential causes of action
against third parties, for instance, the court should assess the value of the thirdparty release. If the parties to an RSA agree to participate in a rights oﬀering
and commit to backstopping that oﬀering (i.e., purchase any unsold shares),
the court should consider the value of this backstopping beneﬁt.
A similar logic applies with independent justiﬁcations that do not directly
beneﬁt the debtor. The signatories to the PREPA RSA, for instance, were
promised interest payments that eﬀectively functioned as a settlement of the
signatory bondholders’ claim to postpetition interest. The threshold question
here, as with waivers or rights oﬀerings, is the reasonableness of the payments.
If independent justiﬁcations are present, a signing fee or diﬀerential compensation may be justiﬁed even if it makes the RSA or deathtrap marginally
more coercive than the risk of holdout behavior appears to warrant. If a fee or
compensation is greater than the beneﬁt provided, however, or if its eﬀect is
highly coercive, it should not be permitted.
D. Is the Holdout Risk Created by Contract?
The discussion thus far has assumed that the parties’ contract does not
purport to impose limitations on restructuring that are intended to apply in
bankruptcy; these limitations may be in the form of provisions such as a supermajority voting rule or unanimity requirement. If the contract does impose
such restrictions, a fourth rule of thumb comes into play: unless there is a good
reason not to honor eﬀorts to contract around the bankruptcy’s voting rules,
courts should view distortive techniques more skeptically, even if the prospect
of holdouts is high. 155
The logic for this rule of thumb, which may initially seem counterintuitive,
comes from an important literature on contract renegotiation. In structuring an
initial contract, the parties face a choice whether to make renegotiation easy or
diﬃcult. Renegotiation is more likely to succeed, for instance, if the contract

155.
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For an argument that bankruptcy judges tend to be too hostile to ex ante contracts, see David A. Skeel, Jr. & George Triantis, Bankruptcy’s Uneasy Shi� to a Contract Paradigm, 166 U.
PA. L. REV. 1777, 1806, 1808-11 (2018). For a discussion of externalities as a legitimate concern, see id. at 1811-12.
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requires only a simple majority vote than if every creditor must agree. 156 Each
approach has key costs and beneﬁts. While easily renegotiated contracts can be
beneﬁcial ex post, as they facilitate a restructuring if the debtor’s fortunes deteriorate, they may create suboptimal incentives ex ante. Renegotiation-proof
contracts, by contrast, can interfere with a restructuring that makes sense ex
post but may create better incentives ex ante.
Although the voting rules in the Bankruptcy Code are mandatory, the debtor or its creditors occasionally attempt to alter them by contract. 157 Loan syndicates are a good illustration of how parties might attempt to contract around
the voting rules. The terms of loan syndicates usually preclude renegotiation of
the loan unless every lender agrees, or provide for other, carefully tailored internal voting arrangements. 158 Because each participant has its own claim, syndicates are subject to the ordinary Chapter 11 voting rules if the debtor ﬁles for
bankruptcy. 159 But a syndicate can also be structured as a single claim representing the entire syndicate, which would be voted in Chapter 11 pursuant to
the syndicate’s voting rules. In my view, courts should honor such arrangements absent clear evidence they impose externalities on other parties. At the
very least, courts should be more skeptical of distortive techniques if the parties’ contract reﬂects a decision to make renegotiation diﬃcult. 160
Because eﬀorts to contract around the bankruptcy voting rules are uncommon, the fourth rule of thumb usually will not come into play in bankruptcy.
But this may change. Further, this rule of thumb has important implications
outside of bankruptcy, as discussed later. 161

156.

See, e.g., Patrick Bolton & David S. Scharfstein, Optimal Debt Structure and the Number of
Creditors, 104 J. POL. ECON. 1, 3 (1996) (arguing that borrowing from multiple creditors discourages the borrower from defaulting and renegotiating).
157. See, e.g., Bank of Am., Nat’l Ass’n v. N. LaSalle St. Ltd. P’ship (In re 203 N. LaSalle St.
P’ship), 246 B.R. 325, 331-32 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2000) (refusing to enforce the assignment of
voting rights from junior to senior creditors).
158.

See, e.g., Amir Suﬁ, Information Asymmetry and Financing Arrangements: Evidence from Syndicated Loans, 62 J. FIN. 629, 633 (2007) (ﬁnding that “unanimity of all syndicate members is
always required to change terms related to principal, interest, maturity, or collateral,” whereas other terms are subject to diﬀerent voting rules).

159.

See 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c) (2018) (deﬁning the acceptance of a plan by a class as two thirds in
amount and a majority in number voting yes).

160.

Another, more complicated, example is bond indentures. Most corporate bond indentures
prohibit the restructuring of a bondholder’s principal without her consent. This restriction,
which is imposed by the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-253, § 316, 53 Stat. 1149,
1172-73 (codiﬁed as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77ppp (2018)), was intended to apply outside of
bankruptcy but not in bankruptcy. This provision is discussed in Sections IV.A, V.B.
161. See infra Section V.B.
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E. Should Creditors Be Permitted to Change Their Votes?
A ﬁnal consideration is whether courts should permit creditors to change
their votes on a reorganization plan if conﬁrmation has been facilitated by the
new distortive techniques. The bankruptcy rules explicitly contemplate vote
changes if a creditor can demonstrate “cause.” 162
Courts have interpreted the “cause” standard quite liberally where a creditor wishes to change a vote that was cast by mistake, or where the reorganization plan was modiﬁed a�er the vote. 163 They also have allowed creditors to
change a rejection to an acceptance a�er the debtor negotiated with the creditor
to secure acceptance. 164 But courts have refused to permit vote changes by creditors seeking strategic advantage or where there appeared to be an improper
motive. 165
The logic of these cases could easily be extended to the new distortive techniques. If courts routinely permitted creditors to change votes that were subject
to distortion, it could undermine the voting process. But in at least two contexts, vote changes may occasionally be appropriate. First, if the creditor would
have been entitled to compensation had she signed an RSA or voted “yes,” and
the RSA or deathtrap is signiﬁcantly distortive, the court could allow the creditor to change her vote and receive the extra compensation if the class votes to

162.

FED. R. BANKR. P. 3018(a) (“For cause shown, the court a�er notice and hearing may permit
a creditor or equity security holder to change or withdraw an acceptance or rejection.”).

163.

See, e.g., In re Am. Solar King Corp., 90 B.R. 808, 826-27 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1988) (approving a vote change because the plan was modiﬁed a�er the debtor had reached a settlement
agreement with the creditor, and no one objected to the change at the relevant hearing). For
a succinct overview of the case law, see Charles M. Oellermann & Mark G. Douglas, Voter’s
Remorse: Taking Back an Acceptance or Rejection of a Chapter 11 Plan, JONES DAY PUBLICATIONS
(Nov.-Dec. 2014), https://www.jonesday.com/en/insights/2014/12/voters-remorse-takingback-an-acceptance-or-rejection-of-a-chapter-11-plan [https://perma.cc/22FK-N5BA].
164. In re Bourbon Saloon, Inc., No. 11-11518, 2012 WL 899282, at *2 (Bankr. E.D. La. Mar. 14,
2012) (allowing a creditor to change its vote from rejection to acceptance a�er the debtor
negotiated with the creditor in an eﬀort to avoid cramdown).
165.
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See, e.g., In re Mcorp Fin., Inc., 137 B.R. 237, 239 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1992) (denying a motion
to change a creditor’s vote because “the timing of the change [was] highly suspect”—the
creditor sought to change his vote on the same day he reached a side agreement with the
debtor, which was one day a�er the debtor realized changing the creditor’s vote would turn
a rejecting class into an accepting class); cf. In re Epic Assocs. V, 62 B.R. 918, 924 (Bankr.
E.D. Va. 1986) (ruling that “cause” for vote changing was established by “the brevity of the
voting period, and the intricacy of the Second Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization and its
supplements”).

distorted choice in corporate bankruptcy

accept the plan. 166 The possibility that a creditor who opposed the plan could
later change her vote would at least slightly reduce the consequences of voting
“no.”
A second context where a vote change may be appropriate is when a creditor has voted “yes,” and her class has approved the plan, but the plan can only
be approved by cramdown, because at least one other class has voted “no.” 167
The vote change would only beneﬁt a creditor if enough claims in her class also
elected to change their vote to shi� the vote of the class from “yes” to “no.” But
where their vote would make a diﬀerence, a vote change would provide creditors the protections given to objecting classes. 168
Vote changes should only be allowed sparingly. But they are a potentially
useful escape valve in cases where the court did not invalidate a signiﬁcantly
distortive RSA or deathtrap.
iv. applying the framework: four c ase s tudies
In this Part, I turn to the practical task of showing how the rules of thumb
might be applied in a particular case. I focus on four widely discussed recent
cases. Each involves a distinctive and creative, but not patently pernicious, use
of the distortive techniques. The rules-of-thumb analysis reveals that distortive
techniques were permissible in PREPA and Momentive, borderline in Arch Coal,
and should have been prohibited in Peabody.
A. PREPA: A Complex RSA 169
The restructuring of Puerto Rico’s electricity company, PREPA, has featured two diﬀerent RSAs, one negotiated (but not ﬁnalized) before and the
other a�er the enactment of legislation giving Puerto Rico and its public corpo166.

If the beneﬁt would not have been available to the creditor—as, for instance, with an RSA
fee that was oﬀered only to creditors that negotiated a plan that the creditor had no involvement in—the vote change should not be permitted.
167. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(8) (2018) (providing that a reorganization plan can be conﬁrmed
consensually only if every class votes “yes”).
168. Two key cramdown protections for an objecting class are the prohibition against “unfair discrimination” and the requirement that the absolute-priority rule be satisﬁed with respect to
the class. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (2018). These protections are not available for a class that approves the plan.
169. As disclosed at the outset of this Article, I am on the Puerto Rico Oversight Board that negotiated and signed the PREPA RSA on behalf of PREPA, and I am actively involved in the
case.
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rations access to a Chapter 11-like restructuring option. 170 Each RSA centered
on PREPA’s largest group of creditors—bondholders who hold more than $8
billion of the company’s $11 billion debt. The earlier RSA would have paid the
bondholders 85% of their claims, but it was eventually rejected by the Oversight Board by a closely divided vote. 171
Over the next year—starting a�er the destruction inﬂicted by Hurricane
Maria—the Oversight Board and an ad hoc group of PREPA bondholders reopened negotiations. The negotiations culminated in a preliminary RSA on July
30, 2018 and a deﬁnitive RSA on May 3, 2019. 172 Assured Guaranty, a major insurer of PREPA bonds, joined the RSA during the months between the preliminary and ﬁnal agreements, 173 and two other bond insurers (Syncora and National) joined a�er the deﬁnitive agreement was signed. 174
Although the proposed PREPA RSA is quite intricate, its basic terms can be
easily stated. Bondholders who joined the RSA would receive new bonds worth
a maximum of 77.5% of their claims, 175 as well as three additional beneﬁts.
First, the bondholders would be given a waiver and support fee of 1.62% of
their claims, as accrued through May 1, 2019. 176 Second, they would receive interest payments at a rate of 5.25%, and these payments would vary based on

170.

The Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA)—the
2016 Puerto Rico legislation—includes a set of restructuring provisions drawn from Chapter
11 and from Chapter 9, which governs municipal bankruptcy. See Pub. L. No. 114-187,
§§ 301-317, 130 Stat. 549, 577-85 (2016). The restructuring provisions are generally referred
to as “Title III,” which is where they appear in PROMESA.
171. See Andrew G. Biggs, Arthur J. Gonzalez, Ana J. Matosantos & David A. Skeel, Jr., Privatize
Puerto Rico’s Power, WALL ST. J. (June 29, 2017, 6:55 PM ET), https://www.wsj.com/articles
/privatize-puerto-ricos-power-1498776904 [https://perma.cc/D8DD-JQ JW].
172.

Amendment No. 3 to Deﬁnitive Restructuring Agreement at 1-2, In re Fin. Oversight &
Mgmt. Bd., No. 17-BK-04780-LTS (D.P.R. Sept. 9, 2019) [hereina�er Conformed Deﬁnitive RSA]; Preliminary Restructuring Support Agreement, In re Fin. Oversight & Mgmt.
Bd., No. 17-BK-04780-LTS (D.P.R. Sept. 9, 2019).

173.

Conformed Deﬁnitive RSA, supra note 172, at 1.
Id at 2. Collectively, the bond insurers held roughly $2.3 billion of PREPA’s bonds as of September 9, 2019. See id. (listing the amounts held by Assured Guaranty, Syncora, and National).

174.

175.

Bondholders would receive two kinds of bonds, an “A bond” that pays 67.5% of their claims,
and a “B bond” whose payout ranges from 0 to 10%, depending on the demand for electricity in the next forty-seven years. See Declaration of David Brownstein in Support of Joint
Motion of Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority and AAFAF Pursuant to Bankruptcy Code
Sections 362, 502, 922, and 928, and Bankruptcy Rules 3012(A)(1) and 9019 for Order Approving Settlements Embodied in the Restructuring Support Agreement at 13, In re Fin.
Oversight & Mgmt. Bd., No. 17-BK-04780-LTS (D.P.R. Sept. 9, 2019).
176. Id. at 28.
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when the bondholder joined the RSA. A bondholder who joined the RSA by
May 31, 2019 would receive interest payments starting as of May 1, 2019. For
bondholders who joined a�er May 31, 2019 but by December 1, 2019, the commencement date would be September 1, 2019. Those that joined a�er December 1, 2019 would not receive interest payments prior to conﬁrmation of a restructuring plan. 177 As a ﬁnal inducement, signatories also would be
reimbursed for the professional fees they incurred in negotiating the RSA, up
to a maximum of $25 million. 178
To assess whether an RSA with these terms should be permitted, start with
the ﬁrst factor, holdouts. Holdouts appear to have been a major concern in the
restructuring in two respects. The ﬁrst is a familiar feature of many current
cases, the eﬀect of a vibrant market for distressed debt. The PREPA bonds were
actively traded, 179 which created the possibility that strategically minded traders would act as holdouts, perhaps threatening to block any deal that had been
tentatively approved by the existing bondholders. The second holdout issue
was distinctive to PREPA’s creditors. At least one of the bond insurers appeared
to be in precarious ﬁnancial condition. If true, the bond insurer had an incentive to resist any signiﬁcant write-down of its debt, even if a write-down were
economically warranted. 180
Given the signiﬁcant holdout concerns, at least some coercion—the second
rule of thumb—could be justiﬁed. The principal question is whether the entitlement or procedural coercion in the RSA was excessive. 181 By itself, the mag177.

See Conformed Deﬁnitive RSA, supra note 172, at 4 (deﬁning “Administrative Claim Commencement”).

178.

Id. at 47.
Andrew Scurria, Puerto Rico Utility Deal Stumbles, Shaking Muni Investors, WALL ST. J. (Mar.
2, 2020, 7:10 PM ET), https://www.wsj.com/articles/puerto-rico-utility-deal-stumblesshaking-muni-investors-11583194215 [https://perma.cc/YN8K-JAJ9] (describing “turnover
among Prepa’s investors”).
180. See, e.g., Rating Action: Moody’s Downgrades MBIA Inc. and National Public Finance Guarantee
Corp. (IFS to Baa2); MBIA Insurance Corp. Aﬃrmed at Caa1, MOODY’S INV. SERV. (Jan. 17,
2018), https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-downgrades-MBIA-Inc-and-NationalPublic-Finance-Guarantee-Corp-PR_377693 [https://perma.cc/TE2Z-G6H7] (attributing
the downgrade to “an increased probability of more severe losses resulting from National’s
Puerto Rico exposures,” among other reasons). It is worth noting that all of the bond insurers would have been paid in full under the original RSA.
179.

181.

The creditors’ committee ﬁercely opposed approval of the RSA, contending that the RSA “is
deeply ﬂawed, and the Government Parties have provided no credible justiﬁcation for the
windfall it will provide to the Supporting Holders.” Oﬃcial Committee of Unsecured Creditors’ Objection to Joint Motion of Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority and AAFAF Pursuant to Bankruptcy Code Sections 362, 502, 922 and 928 and Bankruptcy Rules 3012(a)(1)
and 9019 for Order Approving Settlements Embodied in Restructuring Support Agreement
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nitude of the waiver and support fee—1.62%—seems generous but within the
acceptable range. The interest payments raise issues both of process and entitlement. The payments would be quite substantial—more than double the
amount of the waiver and support fee—and coercively structured, since ﬁrst
adopters begin receiving the payments earlier. The procedural coercion is signiﬁcantly mitigated by the fact that the preliminary RSA was signed nine
months before the deﬁnitive RSA, giving bondholders ample time to decide
whether to join. Given the amount of the overall fees, the entitlement coercion
is a closer call.
Turning to the third rule of thumb, there were at least three independent
justiﬁcations for the terms of the RSA. First, the ad hoc group of bondholders
provided a public good by negotiating the RSA and forgoing trading for extended periods of time, beginning from even before the Title III petition was
ﬁled on behalf of PREPA. 182 These contributions suggest that a generous compensation for costs would be appropriate.
Second, in return for signing the RSA, bondholders relinquished the right
to ask for the appointment of a receiver, which bondholders were entitled to
request if 25% of the bondholders had joined the motion. The receiver’s task
would be to collect what the bondholders were owed, which could easily derail
the reorganization eﬀort. The bond insurers had pursued litigation, asking the
court to permit the receiver to be appointed. If several of the bond insurers
joined the RSA and withdrew from the receiver action, fewer than 25% of the
bondholders needed would support the motion, and the receivership threat
would be averted.
Third, the interest payments settled the bondholders’ contested claim that
they were secured creditors who were entitled to interest payments on the full
amount of their claims for the duration of the restructuring case. Under the
RSA, the bondholders would receive interest, but the payments would begin
more than a year a�er the petition was ﬁled, and the payments would be based
on the amount of their restructured claim, not their full claim. Given that the
RSA fees were on the borderline of being permissible even apart from independent justiﬁcations, and there were substantial independent justiﬁcations,
the RSA seems clearly permissible.
The fourth rule of thumb—the parties’ contracts—adds an important wrinkle but does not alter this conclusion. The PREPA bond contracts include a soat 10, In re Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd., 361 F. Supp. 3d 203 (D.P.R. 2019) (No. 17-BK3283).
182. Because $25 million of their attorneys’ fees were compensated separately, the incremental
value of the public good provided is somewhat less than would otherwise be the case. See
supra text accompanying note 178.
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called unanimity clause—a provision stating that the principal or interest of a
bond cannot be altered unless the individual bondholder consents.183 Outside
of bankruptcy, no bondholder could be bound by a vote of other bondholders
to restructure the bonds. If this provision reﬂected a conscious decision by the
parties to make the bonds diﬃcult to restructure in bankruptcy, it would call
for much more stringent scrutiny of eﬀorts to discipline holdouts. There is
good reason to believe it did not, however. The Trust Indenture Act of 1939 requires that this provision be included in corporate bonds but intends for bond
restructurings to take place in bankruptcy, under bankruptcy’s majority voting
rules. 184 With ordinary corporate bonds, the unanimity requirement is dictated
by law and is intended to be overridden in bankruptcy. 185
There is one ﬁnal twist. Unlike private entities, public issuers such as
PREPA are not subject to the Trust Indenture Act. 186 If the inclusion of the
unanimity requirement reﬂected a conscious decision to discourage renegotiation, a court would need to take this into consideration. But the inclusion of a
unanimity requirement may simply reﬂect a mimicking of the handling of corporate debt. 187 Even if it were more intentional, the same logic would have applied with PREPA debt as with ordinary corporate debt: the debt would be
subject to the unanimity requirement outside of bankruptcy, but it could be restructured under the bankruptcy voting provisions if PREPA ﬁled for (municipal) bankruptcy. 188
The unanimity provision does not alter the earlier conclusion that the
PREPA RSA fees are substantial but justiﬁable. Although the entitlement coer-

183.

Section 1102 of the Trust Agreement, under which PREPA issued bonds, permits most
amendments if 60% of the bonds agree, but excludes any “extension of the maturity of the
principal of or the in[t]erest on any bond” or “a reduction in the principal amount of any
bond.” Trust Agreement, Puerto Rico Water Resources Authority to First National City Bank,
Trustee, § 1102, at 88-89 (Jan. 1, 1974).

184.

See, e.g., Bratton & Levitin, supra note 31, at 1600.
See infra notes 243-244 and accompanying text.

185.
186.

See, e.g., Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, Sovereign Bonds and the Collective Will, 51 EMORY
L.J. 1317, 1329-30 (2002).

187.

See, e.g., id. (noting this possibility).
Puerto Rico had access to municipal bankruptcy when the PREPA indenture was put in
place, and thus could have permitted PREPA to ﬁle for bankruptcy if needed, but it lost access to municipal bankruptcy when Congress adopted a new deﬁnition of “state” in 1984.
For the history, see Stephen J. Lubben, Puerto Rico and the Bankruptcy Clause, 88 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 553, 573-78 (2014). PROMESA created a new bankruptcy-like option in 2016. See Puerto
Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act, Pub. L. No. 114-187, §§ 301-317,
130 Stat. 549, 577-85 (2016).

188.
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cion is signiﬁcant, the high risk of holdout behavior and the presence of substantial independent justiﬁcations suggest that the fees should be permitted.
B. Momentive: A Complex Deathtrap
As discussed earlier, Momentive’s deathtrap gave its senior (First and 1.5
Lien Noteholder) creditors a choice. They could either accept the plan, which
promised payment in cash in full but required the creditors to waive a $200
million make-whole claim. Or they could reject the plan, assert their makewhole claim, and receive replacement notes plus the cramdown rate of interest. 189 To the extent this provision was intended to nudge the senior creditors
into accepting the plan, it didn’t work. The senior creditors rejected the plan,
choosing to litigate their case for the make-whole claim.
Although it is not clear how actively Momentive’s debt was traded, the case
was hotly contested throughout, and the principal creditors were distresseddebt investors who posed a signiﬁcant risk of holdout. 190 The senior and junior
creditors had an elaborate contract—which became a major source of litigation
in the case—but the contract did not alter the voting rights each class of creditor had within its class. 191 The ﬁrst rule of thumb thus suggests that the use of
distortive techniques was warranted, and the fourth—the parties’ contracts—
does not alter this conclusion.
Turning to the second rule of thumb, coercion, there does not appear to
have been procedural coercion. The distortion occurred in the Chapter 11 vote
itself, and the vote was not rushed or otherwise irregular. Although the potential silencing of the junior creditors was hotly contested, 192 the court ultimately
concluded that the deathtrap did not silence any constituency.
The key question is whether the entitlement coercion was excessive. The
ﬁrst point to note is that the senior creditors’ rejection of the plan does not negate the possibility the deathtrap was too coercive. The deathtrap le� the senior
189.

See supra Section I.B.

190.

Cf. Nick Brown, Momentive’s $570 Mln Bankruptcy Loan Package Approved by Judge, REUTERS
(May 23, 2014, 1:05 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/momentive-bankruptcy
/momentives-570-mln-bankruptcy-loan-package-approved-by-judgeidUSL1N0O913C20140523 [https://perma.cc/XCE7-E6BA] (mentioning the involvement of
Aurelius Capital Management and Apollo Global Management LLC). For discussion of the
principal disputes in the case, see Kenneth Ayotte, Anthony J. Casey & David A. Skeel, Jr.,
Bankruptcy on the Side, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 255, 268-69 (2017).
191. Ayotte, Casey & Skeel, supra note 190, at 295-97 (describing voting in the case).
192.
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Id. at 269 (describing the court’s conclusion that the intercreditor agreement did not preclude the junior creditors from objecting).
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creditors with a diﬃcult decision of choosing between accepting a full payout
on a smaller claim, and continuing to insist on receiving an additional makewhole claim but facing the risk of receiving a below-market interest rate on
their claim. Indeed, if the senior creditors were clairvoyant, they would have
known they should not reject the plan, since their make-whole claim would ultimately be disallowed. 193
To assess the deathtrap’s coerciveness, we need to consider two uncertainties in the rejection payout. A deathtrap based on the ﬁrst uncertainty—the validity of the make-whole claim—does not seem problematic. Suppose that the
plan oﬀered the senior creditors $100 in cash—the amount of their claim—but
no make-whole claim if they accepted, and $75 in cash and the right to litigate a
$50 make-whole claim if they rejected the plan. This deathtrap postpones potentially time-consuming make-whole litigation until a�er conﬁrmation of a
plan, thus enabling an earlier conﬁrmation, and it may reﬂect the debtor’s legitimately lower assessment of the likelihood that the senior creditors will succeed. Any coercive eﬀect seems limited and justiﬁed by the risk of holdouts.
In Momentive itself, there was a second uncertainty—the possibility the senior creditors would be given a below-market interest rate on their claim. To illustrate the eﬀects of this uncertainty, suppose the debtor proposes to give the
senior creditors $75 not in cash but in a promissory note bearing a belowmarket interest rate; this depressed rate makes the note worth less than $75.
The threat of a below-market interest rate increases the debtor’s leverage in the
restructuring process. But it is not a tool of the debtor’s own devising. The possibility of a below-market interest rate is the legacy of a problematic Supreme
Court decision.194 Even without considering the third rule of thumb, independent justiﬁcations, 195 the deathtrap was therefore defensible. On the fourth
rule of thumb, the parties’ intercreditor agreement did not include voting rules
purporting to alter the bankruptcy voting rules. 196
Although the bankruptcy judge felt compelled to conﬁrm a below-market
interest rate, the Second Circuit reversed on this one point, instructing the

193.

Absent clairvoyance, whether the provision was coercive would depend in part on the senior
creditors’ ex ante probability of success on their make-whole claim.
194. Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465 (2004). Criticism of Till is widespread. See, e.g., Anthony J. Casey, Bankruptcy’s Endowment Eﬀect, 33 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 141, 143-45 (2016).
195. The principal independent justiﬁcation was postponing the make-whole litigation until a�er
conﬁrmation. Its signiﬁcance was limited, given that the debtor could have attained this
beneﬁt without using a deathtrap.
196.

Second Lien Intercreditor Agreement, In re MPM Silicones, L.L.C., No. 14-22503-rdd
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2014), 2014 WL 4436335.
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bankruptcy court to take the market rate into account. 197 If this ruling is generally followed, it will remove debtor’s ability to wield the prospect of a belowmarket interest rate over creditors. That was the dominant source of coercion
in Momentive, not the deathtrap provision, which was simply an elaborate version of the generally permissible traditional deathtrap.
C. Coal Company RSAs and Deathtraps
Since 2010, most of the largest coal-mining companies in the United States,
including Peabody, Arch Coal, and Patriot, have gone through Chapter 11 at
least once. The reorganizations have been controversial because the companies
have shed both environmental and pension obligations in their bankruptcy cases. 198 Perhaps not surprisingly, the coal companies have been quite aggressive
in their use of the new distortive techniques. The discussion that follows considers both Arch Coal and Peabody.
1. Arch Coal
Arch Coal, which ﬁled for bankruptcy in early 2016, initially proposed a reorganization plan with a deathtrap. The deathtrap would have reinstated adequate-protection claims that the senior creditors had waived if the unsecured
creditors’ committee (Committee) obtained standing to pursue litigation, if the
Committee objected to the plan, or if the unsecured creditors voted against the
plan. 199 The Committee strenuously objected to this treatment.
By its structure, the deathtrap thus appeared to eﬀect both procedural and
entitlement coercion. It sought to silence the principal representative of general
creditors—the Committee—and threatened to deplete the assets that would
otherwise be available to unsecured creditors if they voted against the plan.
The ﬁnal version of Arch Coal’s plan included a diﬀerent deathtrap provision. If the class of unsecured-funded-debt claims voted “yes,” 200 the allowed197.

In the Matter of MPM Silicones, L.L.C, 874 F.3d 787, 799-801 (2d Cir. 2017). The Second
Circuit held that Till did not preclude consideration of market interest where there is a clear
market for the type of loan in question.
198. See Joshua Macey & Jackson Salovaara, Bankruptcy as Bailout: Coal Company Insolvency and
the Erosion of Federal Law, 71 STAN. L. REV. 879, 882-85 (2019).
199. Secured creditors can seek adequate protection to ensure that the collateral securing their
debt is suﬃcient for the value of their claims. 11 U.S.C. §§ 361, 362(d)(1) (2018).
200. The class of unsecured-funded-debt claims included both the allowed-notes claims and the
ﬁrst-lien deﬁciency claim. See Debtors’ Third Amended Plan of Reorganization at 46-47, In
re Arch Coal, Inc., No. 16-40120-705 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. Jan. 11, 2016), ECF No. 1091.
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notes claims would receive a pro rata share of an eventual distribution. 201 If the
class of unsecured-funded-debt claims voted “no,” a holder of an allowed-notes
claim would receive a pro rata share of the eventual distribution 202 only if it either voted “yes” or did not vote and agreed to a release of third-party claims. 203
The eﬀect of the deathtrap was to treat holders of allowed-notes claims
who voted “yes” and agreed to release the third-party claims diﬀerently from
those who did not, in the event the class of unsecured-funded-debt claims as a
whole voted “no.” A holder of an allowed-notes claim who voted “no” would
receive a lower payout than others in its class if the plan was conﬁrmed.
Here, the potential threat of holdouts appears to have been signiﬁcant,
since the allowed-notes claims were actively traded. The ﬁrst rule of thumb
therefore suggests that the use of a distortive technique may be appropriate.
Although procedural coercion was not present—the voting process was not
rushed or irregular—the deathtrap imposed entitlement coercion that was
analogous to a structurally coercive tender oﬀer in corporate law.204
The holders of allowed-notes claims were not as vulnerable as shareholders
faced with a coercive two-tier tender oﬀer in corporate law, given their greater
ability to coordinate. And holders who agreed to the third-party releases were
providing an independent beneﬁt by waiving their right to pursue third-party
claims. The deathtrap may therefore have been justiﬁable, but it appears to
have been right on the margin between legitimate and problematic.205 Given
this close call, it would have been appropriate for a bankruptcy court to allow a
creditor that voted “no” to change its vote a�er the fact and to receive the higher recovery. But the deathtrap was not coercive enough to warrant striking it
down.

201.

The ﬁrst-lien deﬁciency claim was excluded from the distribution described in the text. Id. at
30-31.
202. Id.
203.

Allowed-notes claim holders could agree to release third-party claims either by signing the
RSA, which committed signatories to the release, or by not opting out of the releases.

204.

For discussion of structurally coercive tender oﬀers, see supra note 136 and accompanying
text.

205.

The value of the diﬀerential compensation, and thus the magnitude of the coercion, cannot
be determined from the record in the case. In its liquidation analysis for the case, the debtor
estimated the total recovery for “unsecured debt instrument claims” to be very low, 1.2% to
2.9%. Debtors’ Third Amended Plan of Reorganization, supra note 200, App’x B, at B-5.
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2. Peabody Energy
When Peabody Energy ﬁled for bankruptcy in 2016, it had several major
groups of secured creditors and one major unsecured class: $2.85 billion of ﬁrst
liens; $1 billion of second-lien secured notes; and $4.5 billion of unsecured senior notes and subordinated debentures. 206 Even before bankruptcy, the unsecured-note and debenture holders had challenged the scope of the secured
creditors’ liens. A�er ﬁling for bankruptcy, Peabody sided with the unsecured
creditors and objected to the scope of the liens. The bankruptcy court sent the
contending parties into mediation. Creditors that wished to participate would
be required to refrain from trading during the mediation. A creditor that did
not participate initially could subsequently petition to be included, subject to
the same no-trading condition.
The mediation participants used the process not just to resolve the lien dispute, but to create a framework for the overall reorganization. The centerpiece
of the framework was a two-part ﬁnancing arrangement that would raise $1.5
billion of exit ﬁnancing for Peabody, 207 while also providing attractive beneﬁts
for the creditors involved. The ﬁrst part would raise $750 million through a
rights oﬀering of new common stock. Select creditors could participate and
purchase new common stock at a 45% discount to the expected value of the
stock. 208
The second part, a private placement of $750 million of new preferred stock
at a 35% discount, created far more controversy. 209 The private placement had
three tranches:

206.

For a nice summary of these and other features of the case, as well as the issues that Peabody
raises, see John J. Rapisardi & Joseph Zujkowski, Chapter 11 Plan Support Agreements: Greasing the Wheels for Conﬁrmation Success, LAW.COM (Nov. 15, 2019, 11:45 AM),
https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2019/11/15/chapter-11-plan-support-agreements
-greasing-the-wheels-for-conﬁrmation-success [https://perma.cc/342M-SWP9]. See also In
re Peabody Energy Corp., 582 B.R. 771, 775 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 2017), aﬀ ’d, 933 F.3d 918 (8th
Cir. 2019) (“The Debtors ﬁled for Chapter 11 bankruptcy on April 13, 2016. At that time, the
coal industry was continuing to experience a decline, and the Debtors had approximately
$8.8 billion in outstanding principal long-term debt. Approximately $4.3 billion of this debt
was secured by collateral that included real property at the Debtors’ larger coal mines. Another $3.7 billion of this debt was senior unsecured debt, with the remaining amounts represented by convertible junior subordinated debentures.”).
207. Exit ﬁnancing is funding that a reorganized debtor can use a�er it emerges from bankruptcy.
208.

In re Peabody Energy Corp., 933 F.3d 918, 922 (8th Cir. 2019).
209. In a private placement, shares are sold only to preselected investors.
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1. 22.5% of the placement was made available only to seven second-lien
holders and noteholders that had been principal architects of the
proposed plan;
2. 5% was available to any creditor, but creditors were given fewer than
three days to provide the required documentation;
3. 72% was available to any creditor, subject to supplying the required
documentation in roughly 30 days. 210
The core documentation obligation was joining the parties’ PSA. 211 Under
the PSA, the second-lien holders would receive 52% of their claims and the unsecured creditors 22%.212 Signatories were required to vote in favor of the plan,
forgo any objections to the plan, agree to a sizeable breakup fee if the PSA was
not honored, and agree to backstop the rights oﬀering and private placement in
return for a fee. 213 Backstopping the rights oﬀering would require creditors to
purchase all unclaimed shares, guaranteeing that the debtor would raise $750
million.
An ad hoc group of second liens and noteholders who had not joined the
mediation challenged the private placement. 214 “That a heist of the sort
planned here has not been attempted in recent memory should not be surprising,” they complained. 215 The ad hoc objectors insisted that the private placement’s fees violated the requirement that all the members of a class of creditors
be treated the same. The ad hoc group also oﬀered to sponsor a $1.75 billion
rights oﬀering without any discount to the expected value of the stock, and to
serve as backstop for the oﬀering. The bankruptcy court, district court, and
Eighth Circuit all rejected these arguments and upheld the reorganization plan.

210.
211.
212.
213.

In re Peabody, 933 F.3d at 922-23.
Id.
Id. at 923.
Id. at 922-923.

214.

The creditors’ committee initially opposed the proposed plan and rights oﬀering but
dropped its objection when the proponents agreed to set aside $60 million for general unsecured claims. Brief for Appellee Oﬃcial Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Peabody Energy Corp. at 3, 6, In re Peabody Energy Corp., 933 F.3d 918 (8th Cir. 2019) (No. 18-1302).
A�er the objectors oﬀered an alternative ﬁnancing transaction, the creditors’ committee negotiated for an additional $15 million in return for a commitment not to withdraw its support. Id. at 7.
215. Objection of Ad Hoc Committee of Non-Consenting Creditors to Conﬁrmation of Debtors’
Chapter 11 Plan at 3, In re Peabody Energy Corp., 582 B.R. 771 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 2017) (No.
16-42529).
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The Eighth Circuit signaled discomfort with the aggressiveness of the debtor’s
arrangement, however. The court was right to express uneasiness, as we shall
see.
The ﬁrst thing to note is that rights oﬀerings and private placements sponsored by creditors are both controversial and increasingly common. One possible response would simply be to prohibit them, given the diﬃculty of determining whether they are fair. Banning these oﬀerings would be defensible if it
forced debtors to use alternative methods to nudge creditors to support a plan
and compensate those who negotiated a plan. The principal cost would be losing a potentially valuable source of ﬁnancing for companies emerging from
Chapter 11.
If rights oﬀerings and their ilk are not banned, how should the Peabody private placement be assessed? The ﬁrst rule of thumb, holdout risk, strongly favors permitting at least some distortive techniques. The case was heavily litigated, there was signiﬁcant trading of Peabody claims, 216 and the risk of
holdout behavior was signiﬁcant throughout the case. 217
Turning to the rights oﬀering—the parties’ response to the holdout risk—
each tranche raises concerns. The issue with the ﬁrst tranche was not coercion,
but rather that the payout possibly promised more to the seven creditors than
their involvement in negotiations could justify—potentially amounting to a
windfall. The inside creditors may have used their control of the process to obtain private beneﬁts. The second and third tranches created both procedural
and entitlement coercion. Because the parties had only three days to decide
whether to participate in the second tranche, 218 they faced signiﬁcant procedural coercion. And because the compensation for participating in the second
and third tranches—including the steep discount for the stock and the backstop
fees—seems to have been above market, these tranches were quite coercive
from an entitlement perspective.
The procedural coercion seems to have been the one feature of the private
placement that concerned the Eighth Circuit. “It is troubling,” the court wrote,

216.

217.

See, e.g., Taylor Kuykendall, Peabody’s Bankruptcy Exit Painful Lesson in Distressed Firms for
Some Investors, S&P GLOBAL MKT. INTELLIGENCE (May 3, 2017, 8:07 AM)
https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/news-insights/trending/n1yauikkarjet7a3hy7ja2 [https://perma.cc/SUN9-J4TU].

The same factors that created signiﬁcant holdout concerns also reduced the likelihood that
the PSA would undermine the voting process by silencing potential objections to the reorganization plan. For discussion of the risk that creditor agreements may silence potentially
important objections, see Ayotte, Casey & Skeel, supra note 190, at 285-86; and Baird, supra
note 16, at 617.
218. In re Peabody, 933 F.3d at 923.
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“that creditors wishing to take part in the Private Placement had to elect to do
so before approval of all the agreements and the disclosure statement.” 219 The
court nevertheless found independent justiﬁcations, concluding that the arrangement was acceptable because “time was of the essence given the volatile
nature of the coal market,” and “delay was likely to cost the Debtors around $30
million per month in addition to other litigation costs.” 220
The Eighth Circuit showed little concern for the ﬁrst tranche giving exclusive rights to seven creditors and for the magnitude of its recoveries for creditors that joined one or more of the three tranches; nor did the court consider
the entitlement coercion this created. According to the court, the exclusivity of
the ﬁrst tranche was justiﬁed because “that sub-group took on more [backstopping] obligations” than other creditors in the same class.221 Further, the
supra-competitive cost of the private placement was acceptable because “the
Debtors might not have convinced the parties to the security-interest dispute to
settle or commit to any number of the other agreements if the Debtors had not
oﬀered the preferred stock at a discount.” 222 In eﬀect, the court concluded that
the rights oﬀering was coercive and potentially problematic, but there were independent justiﬁcations for the distortive technique. 223
But if we focus more directly on the coercive features of the private placement than the Eighth Circuit did, the court’s conclusions seem deeply problematic. Procedural coercion lends itself to relatively clear rules. Absent truly
extraordinary circumstances (i.e., a highly compelling independent justiﬁcation), a three-day joinder period is simply too rushed, particularly because the
creditors that did not participate in the mediation had only recently learned
about the private placement. In this regard, it is worth comparing how the law
treats tender-oﬀer deadlines. Tender oﬀers must be held open for at least twenty days, under securities-law reforms and SEC regulations promulgated in response to the structurally similar Saturday Night Specials of the 1960s. 224
The entitlement coercion is less straightforward. A signiﬁcant problem
with rights oﬀerings is that they are hard to value, making it diﬃcult to tell just
how much they are compensating the parties for joining the PSA. The ad hoc

219.
220.

Id. at 928.
Id.

221.

Id.
222. Id.
223.

Id. Although the Eighth Circuit did not emphasize this, the subgroup also bore the cost of
forgoing the opportunity to trade while the mediation was ongoing. In re Peabody Energy
Corp., 582 B.R. 771, 782 (E.D. Mo. 2017).
224. See discussion supra notes 139-140 and accompanying text.
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objectors claimed the compensation to signatories was $1.4 billion, 225 but this
and any other number is speculative. For a bankruptcy judge presumptively to
prohibit rights oﬀerings would seem quite justiﬁable and in keeping with
courts’ treatment of potentially problematic provisions in the debtor-inpossession ﬁnancing realm. 226 Alternatively, given the potential beneﬁts of
rights oﬀerings, 227 courts could police rights oﬀerings much more carefully, for
instance by requiring that they be made available to all creditors and subject to
a market test. 228
Absent a presumption against rights oﬀerings as part of a PSA, a court
needs to determine whether the entitlement coercion is excessive, as well as the
related question of whether plan proponents are receiving excessive compensation for the public good they have supplied. In this case, the answer to both
questions appears to be yes. The rights oﬀering was expected to be quite lucrative, given the large discount from expected market values. 229 The favored
creditors’ exclusive access to the ﬁrst tranche gave them an extremely high potential recovery, and the discounted shares available in the other tranches created signiﬁcant pressure for nonparticipants in the mediation to sign the PSA.
The presence of independent justiﬁcations, such as the need for a prompt
reorganization and for exit ﬁnancing, might warrant a somewhat more coercive
PSA than would otherwise be the case. But the independent justiﬁcations were
not so extraordinary as to justify the enormous beneﬁts enjoyed by the plan
proponents and other participating creditors. 230
225.

The ad hoc objectors alleged that the initial 22.5% tranche alone would assure its seven recipients a $103.5 million proﬁt and that the overall proﬁt on the private placement would be
$1.4 billion. Objection of Ad Hoc Committee of Non-Consenting Creditors to Conﬁrmation
of Debtors’ Chapter 11 Plan, supra note 215, at 2-3.

226.

The bankruptcy judges in the Southern District of New York have guidelines requiring proponents of debtor-in-possession loans to ﬂag explicitly, among other things, any provision
using new collateral to collateralize prepetition obligations. See LOCAL BANKR. R. S.D.N.Y
4001-2(a)(6).

227.

In a volatile industry such as oil and gas, for instance, there may be a signiﬁcant beneﬁt to
lining up exit ﬁnancing in advance. See Email from James Sprayregen, Partner, Kirkland &
Ellis LLP, to author (Aug. 3, 2020, 6:05 PM EST) (on ﬁle with author).
228. For a nice analysis of the Peabody case and a proposal for “reasonableness” scrutiny of rights
oﬀerings along these lines, see Shelby V. Saxon, Rights Oﬀerings and Private Placements in
Chapter 11: How Creditors Can Strike a Windfall Within the Boundaries of the Bankruptcy Code,
AM. BANKR. L.J. (forthcoming 2020).
229. Though rights oﬀerings are typically diﬃcult to value, the parties to the mediation in Peabody agreed on a value for the equity. In re Peabody Energy Corp., 582 B.R. 771, 776 n.5
(E.D. Mo. 2017).
230.
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One response to the coercion might be to permit the objecting creditors to
change their vote against the plan and to require that they be allowed to participate in the rights oﬀering. The procedural and entitlement coercion could be
construed as “cause” for giving the objecting creditors an opportunity to revisit
their earlier decision. 231
But this would not address the excessive compensation in the ﬁrst tranche
of the rights oﬀering, which was available only to plan proponents, and the
distortive techniques in Peabody were so egregious that they deserved a more
aggressive rebuke. Peabody would have been a prime case for the court to refuse
to approve the rights oﬀering and signal that acutely coercive PSA terms will
not be permitted, much as Delaware courts have done with extreme corporate
lockups. 232 By policing egregious uses of distortive techniques, bankruptcy
courts could curb the parties’ temptation to overreach and thereby simplify
their own task of discerning improperly coercive tactics.
v. extensions
Although the rules of thumb outlined in Part III were developed with bankruptcy’s new distortive techniques in mind, the same logic can be applied in
analogous contexts. In this Part, I extend the analysis to two issues that bear a
strong familial relationship to the new distortive techniques: gi�ing in Chapter
11 and coercive bond-exchange oﬀers outside of bankruptcy.
A. Gi�ing Transactions
In a gi�ing transaction, one class of claims relinquishes a portion of its recovery and “donates” this portion to a class of equal or lower priority. 233 In In re
DBSD North America, for instance, the second-lien creditors purported to gi� a
portion of their recovery to DBSD’s shareholder, which would receive stock and
purported to limit restructuring. But there was no claim that the parties intended to limit restructuring through contract.
231. See supra Section III.E.
232.

In Revlon, the Delaware Supreme Court struck down an asset lockup that purported to
commit to selling Revlon’s “crown jewels” to the favored bidder. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 184-85 (Del. 1986). In QVC, the court struck
down a lockup of 20% of the target’s stock. Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network,
Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 39 (Del. 1994).
233. See Michael Carnevale, Comment, Is Gi�ing Dead in Chapter 11 Reorganizations? Examining
Absolute Priority in the Wake of the Second Circuit’s No-Gi� Rule in In re DBSD, 15 U. PA. J.
BUS. L. 225, 230-31 (2012).
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warrants in the reorganized debtor—despite Sprint holding unsecured claims
in a higher-priority class, objecting to the plan, and not being paid in full. 234
Although DBSD receiving stock and warrants seemed to violate the absolutepriority rule, the debtor argued that the shareholder’s recovery should not
count for absolute-priority-rule purposes because it was a gi�, not a distribution from the estate. 235
Gi�ing diﬀers from the other distortive techniques we have considered in
two respects. First, although it can distort the voting process by circumventing
the vote of an objecting class and by helping to secure a favorable vote from the
class receiving the gi�, gi�ing is not directly linked to the vote. Second, gi�ing
purports to be an intercreditor transfer, rather than a transfer from the debtor
or the estate. But the eﬀect of gi�ing is quite similar to those of the other distortive techniques, and securing a favorable vote is usually one of the objectives
of a gi�ing transaction. Gi�ing also is sometimes used in combination with an
RSA or deathtrap. 236
Courts have been far more hostile to gi�ing than to the other distortive
techniques. Although gi�ing is sometimes permitted, 237 the Second and Third
Circuits have largely banned the practice. In In re DBSD North America, for instance, the Second Circuit held that the purported gi� violated the absolutepriority rule and refused to conﬁrm the proposed plan. 238
The analysis of this Article helps explain why courts have been so skeptical
of gi�ing transactions. In eﬀect, the gi�ing arrangement is like inﬁnite coercion of the intervening class—the class is forced to agree to the transaction,
even if the members of the class vote to reject the plan. Moreover, unlike with

234.

Dish Network Corp. v. DBSD N. Am., Inc. (In re DBSD N. Am., Inc.), 634 F.3d 79, 93-94
(2d Cir. 2011).
235. The Second Circuit ultimately rejected this argument. Id. at 98-101.
236.

See, e.g., Kevin J. Walsh, Uncertain Times: Recent Bankruptcy Case Law Leaves Parties Unsure
and Possibly Searching for Alternatives, ASPATORE, Dec. 2011, at *4, 2011 WL 6471012 (suggesting that deathtraps can be used to encourage acceptance of a plan that includes a gi�). Interestingly, a�er the bankruptcy court rejected a deathtrap in the early case In re MCorp Fin.,
Inc., 137 B.R. 219, 236 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1992), the district court later conﬁrmed a plan that
included a gi�. In re MCorp Fin., Inc., 160 B.R. 941, 960 (S.D. Tex. 1993).

237.

E.g., Oﬃcial Unsecured Creditors’ Comm. v. Stern (In re SPM Mfg. Corp.), 984 F.2d 1305,
1311-15 (1st Cir. 1993).

238.

634 F.3d at 98-101; see also In re Armstrong World Indus., 432 F.3d 507, 514 (3d Cir. 2005)
(providing another example of a court ﬁnding that a gi�ing scheme violated the absolutepriority rule). In In re DBSD, the Second Circuit distinguished the case from In re SPM
Manufacturing Corp. in two respects—ﬁrst pointing out that it was a Chapter 7 case, so the
absolute-priority rule did not explicitly apply, and second that the property in question belonged to the secured creditor because the stay had been li�ed. In re DBSD, 634 F.3d at 98.
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RSA fees, the beneﬁciary of the gi� generally does not provide any additional
beneﬁt to the estate that justiﬁes the compensation it receives. 239
This does not mean that gi�ing should never be permitted. In the face of a
severe holdout problem, gi�ing may sometimes be appropriate. This is the
most plausible defense of a gi�ing transaction in Detroit’s municipal bankruptcy, for instance, where a class of unlimited tax bonds purported to gi� a portion of their recovery to Detroit’s pension beneﬁciaries. 240 The gi� weakened
the potential unfair-discrimination objections of two monoline insurers that
had held out for much of the case. 241 Even here, the gi� was somewhat questionable, because the insurers’ holdout does not appear to have been simply
strategic. 242 But a court might plausibly conclude the gi� was defensible. Absent a very serious holdout issue, gi�s should not be permitted. Courts’ tendency to view them much more skeptically than RSAs or deathtrap provisions
is thus entirely justiﬁed.
B. Coercive Bond Exchanges
Under section 316(b) of the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, a corporate bond
cannot include a provision that facilitates a vote to restructure the bonds outside of bankruptcy if the company falls into ﬁnancial distress.243 Each bondholder must be permitted to decide for herself whether to accept any proposal
to “impair” the payment terms of the bonds. According to William Douglas,
the leading New Deal proponent of section 316(b), the objective was to ensure
that troubled companies with signiﬁcant bond debt would restructure in bankruptcy rather than outside of bankruptcy. 244 In bankruptcy, the restructuring
would take place under the watchful eye of a bankruptcy judge.
Faced with this stricture, companies that wish to restructure their bonds
outside of bankruptcy make exchange oﬀers, where the company asks bondholders to accept a restructured bond in place of their current bond. The strat239.

“The ‘gi�’ . . . may not be made to obtain valuable services going forward, but rather to ensure that the reorganization takes the shape that the senior creditor wants.” BARRY E. ADLER,
ANTHONY J. CASEY & EDWARD R. MORRISON, BAIRD & JACKSON’S BANKRUPTCY: CASES,
PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS 881 (5th ed. 2020).
240. In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. 147, 187-90 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2014).
241.

See id. at 257-58.
242. It is also unclear whether all of the unlimited tax bondholders were even aware that giving a
portion of their recovery to the pensioners could be treated as a gi�.
243. 15 U.S.C. § 77ppp(b) (2018).
244.

The legislative history of section 316(b) is discussed in DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT’S
ION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMERICA 121-22 (2001).
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egy works only if a high percentage of bondholders—o�en 90%—agree to the
exchange, since nonconsenting bondholders need to be paid in full. 245 To
nudge bondholders to accept, the exchanges o�en include an element of coercion. The company may ask consenting bondholders to vote to alter the terms
of the old bonds in an undesirable way, for instance, without expressly impairing the bonds’ payment terms. 246
In Marblegate Asset Management, LLC v. Education Management Finance
Corp., 247 the debtor took this strategy to the extreme. Under the terms of the
exchange, the assets of Education Management Corporation (EDMC) would
be sold in a foreclosure to a newly created subsidiary of EDMC. Consenting
bondholders would receive restructured bonds with claims against the new
subsidiary. The payment rights of nonconsenting bondholders would not be
explicitly altered, but they would be le� with a claim against a company that no
longer had any assets—an empty shell. 248 A divided panel of the Second Circuit
upheld the transaction. According to the majority, section 316(b) was intended
only to prohibit amendments to payment terms, not to forbid restructurings
done through foreclosure. 249 So long as the payment terms are not altered, the
court concluded, the exchange should be permitted. 250
The ﬁrst thing to note is that the fourth rule of thumb—the nature of the
parties’ contracts—is especially important for assessing bond-exchange oﬀers.
Unlike Chapter 11, which nudges the parties toward a restructuring, section
316(b) was intended to discourage out-of-court restructuring and channel the
debtor into bankruptcy. Courts’ willingness to permit coercive bond exchanges
appears to be colored by their doubts about the wisdom of this baseline—
reservations that are widely shared by commentators. 251
The “impairment” language in section 316(b) can be seen as a proxy for
this Article’s second rule of thumb—the degree of coercion, especially entitlement coercion. If construed broadly, the language would suggest that the debtor cannot pressure a bondholder to accept a restructuring in any way—
completely forbidding entitlement coercion. It would not be diﬃcult to strictly

245.

See John C. Coﬀee, Jr. & William A. Klein, Bondholder Coercion: The Problem of Constrained
Choice in Debt Tender Oﬀers and Recapitalizations, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1207, 1214-15 (1991).
246. See Bratton & Levitin, supra note 31, at 1608-11.
247.
248.

846 F.3d 1 (2d Cir. 2017).
Id. at 4.

249.

Id. at 10.
250. Id. at 17.
251.
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The classic early article is Mark J. Roe, The Voting Prohibition in Bond Workouts, 97 YALE L.J.
232, 277-79 (1987).
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enforce section 316(b)’s no-impairment rule, and the results would not be as
dire as sometimes feared. Given the ease of eﬀecting a prepackaged bankruptcy,
many of the ﬁrms that conduct bond exchanges could achieve the same beneﬁts
nearly as quickly in bankruptcy. 252
If a more ﬂexible interpretation of “impairment” is inevitable, the ﬁrst rule
of thumb, holdouts, becomes far more important. Marblegate responded to the
holdout problem in that case, but it did so with a reading of section 316(b) that
could eviscerate any limits on coercion unless reined in by subsequent courts. A
better solution would be to deﬁne “impairment” strictly, but to exclude cases
where there is a severe holdout problem.253 Marblegate was just such a case. If
EDMC failed to restructure and was forced to ﬁle for bankruptcy, it would lose
the federal funding that was essential to its business. A single large holdout
creditor—Marblegate—refused to agree to the restructuring, implicitly threatening to destroy the company unless it received a special payout. Under these
highly unusual circumstances, extreme entitlement coercion was justiﬁed. 254
Notice that the same rules of thumb we used to analyze bankruptcy’s new
distortive techniques also can be used with gi�ing and bond-exchange oﬀers.
Granted, the analysis develops quite diﬀerently, given the diﬀerent contexts.
With both gi�ing and bond-exchange oﬀers, a strong presumption against
permitting the strategies is warranted.

252.

Bratton and Levitin suggest that secured-creditor control makes bankruptcy an unpromising
alternative. Bratton & Levitin, supra note 31, at 1642-45. This does not seem likely to be a serious obstacle where secured creditors will be fully protected, as they are in most prepackaged bankruptcies. It is more of an issue with companies that are not readily amenable to a
prepackaged bankruptcy.

253.

A similar result could be achieved by coupling Marblegate’s lax reading of impairment with a
good-faith obligation, as some scholars have advocated. See id. at 1673; see also DAVID CHRISTOPH EHMKE, BOND DEBT GOVERNANCE: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF DIFFERENT SOLUTIONS
TO FINANCIAL DISTRESS OF CORPORATE BOND DEBTORS 238 (2018) (“[O]ne can reasonabl[y]
read sec 316(b) TIA in a way that . . . does not protect holdouts from being exposed to a
higher risk level once the exit consent is completed.”).

254.

In doctrinal terms, a court might conclude Marblegate’s payment rights were not truly impaired because the company would fail absent the exchange, and bondholders would receive
little or nothing in bankruptcy. This is similar to the approach used by the Supreme Court in
the Contracts Clause context. See Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park, 316 U.S.
502, 513-16 (1942) (holding that restructuring of municipal bonds did not violate the Contracts Clause because it made bondholders better oﬀ in the context of a ﬁnancial crisis).
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conclusion
The new distortive techniques appear unseemly, o�en moving the Chapter
11 voting process far away from the ideal of voting only on the merits. The
simplest and initially most appealing response would be to ban them.
Yet a strong antidistortion rule turns out to be undesirable once the structure of Chapter 11 and the nature of current Chapter 11 practice are taken into
account. Some distortive techniques, such as a traditional deathtrap, are fully
consistent with Chapter 11. Others are needed to counteract the instability of
creditors in current cases and the signiﬁcantly heightened risk of holdouts.
Even seemingly problematic features of the new distortive techniques o�en
prove justiﬁable in context.
These factors suggest that the new distortive techniques should be policed
rather than banned. In this Article, I have attempted to provide insights into
how this might be done by oﬀering rules of thumb to guide the analysis.
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